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This study investigates the effect of developers’ local market power on housing prices. The 
advantage of analysing market power at the district level, as opposed to at the national level, is 
that the planning district provides the basic unit for local administration and urban planning. It 
is also easier for developers to gain market power locally, rather than on the national level. 
This study focuses on the pre-sale housing market in Singapore.  The data for the analysis is 
extracted from Real Estate Information System (REALIS), a database maintained by the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA) of Singapore. The study sample covers 1,199 private non-
landed housing projects and includes over 109,000 sale transactions between 2003 and 2014.  
To measure a developer’s market power, several measures are employed. They include a 
developer’s local and national market power as well as, a project’s local and national market 
power. Market power is measured by the total number of unsold units in a project or owned by 
a developer over the total number of unsold units in the local district or in the whole economy. 
In addition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is employed to measure the concentration of 
developers at the local level. In addition the geographic boundaries of the planning districts, 
local market power of developers and projects is also measured based on concentric rings.  
The estimation technique used is the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with sale prices 
and time-on-the-market as the dependent variables. This method controls for the endogeneity 
between house price and time on the market. The data shows that the local market power of 
Singapore developers range from 0.02% to 100%.  The regression results indicate that local 
market power allows developers to control prices and shorten the selling time.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
This chapter first sets out the background to the research problem, followed by an elaboration 
of the research problem and the rationale for conducting this study. Second, the research 
questions and objectives will be discussed. Finally, the chapter will conclude with the structure 
of the dissertation.   
 
1.1. Background & Motivation 
According to Sirmans, Rosenthal and Harding (2003), real estate markets are characterized by 
highly differentiated products, whose prices depend on the ‘hedonic’ characteristics of the 
products as well as on the market bargaining power of sellers and buyers. In addition to the 
timing of the market, a few studies have also documented that prices are significantly affected 
by market power and other attributes of the buyers and sellers (Turnbull, Sirmans and Benjamin, 
1991; Turnbull and Herbert, 2011; Turnbull and Dombrow, 2006).  
Existing studies have focused mainly on the bargaining power of the suppliers and buyers in 
the secondary (resale) market (e.g. Haurin, 1988), which can be viewed as involving atomistic 
individuals. Less attention has been paid on the bargaining power of agents in the primary (new 
sale) market because it was assumed to be a competitive industry (e.g. Ahluwalia, 1994). 
Observing that the market power of developers differ across regions and metropolitan areas, 
Somerville (1999) however concludes that the homebuilder market structure is actually more 
monopolistic than perfectly competitive as assumed previously. Examining the reasons why 
property developers with larger market share are able to set higher prices, Turnbull (1993) 
reasons that developers with higher market share usually have significant information about 
the market. They are thus able to set and command higher prices for comparable houses. From 
a policy perspective, the market power of local developers may therefore be detrimental to 
home buyers because of its tendency to lead to higher home prices.  
In addition, developers with higher market power could take advantage of their bargaining 
power to control the time on the market (TOM) of their projects. The positive relationship 
between sale price and time on the market is not surprising given the trade-offs: sellers have to 
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offer considerable discounts if they wish to sell their property quickly. In support to this 
argument, Ott et al. (2011) find that developers with high market power seem to be able to set 
higher prices and sell the properties quickly (i.e. lower time on the market) than other 
developers with less bargaining strength. They further argue that the effect of market power 
may differ depending on the market conditions and on availability of the economies of scale. 
Focusing on the market bargaining power of Singapore developers, this study examines 
whether local developers are able to take advantage of their market power to sell their 
properties quickly without compromising the selling prices. The study is relevant for policy-
makers, particularly in providing guidance to the desirable level of competition in the local real 
estate market.   
 
1.2.Research Questions 
This thesis aims to analyze the level of market power among developers in Singapore, and 
investigate the importance of the market bargaining power on asset prices and time on the 
market (TOM). It is generally thought that developers with significant market power are able 
to command higher house prices and able to achieve shorter marketing time compared to the 
developers with low market power. To examine if the market power of developers is a 
significant factor for pricing and successful marketing of development projects, the empirical 
research in this thesis is guided by the following questions: 
First, all else being equal, are developers with strong market power able to command higher 
prices compared to developers with weak market power?  
Second, all else being equal, are developers with strong market power able to achieve faster 
time-on-the-market for their projects than other developers with weak market power?  
Third, if there is indeed a price premium to local market power, is the effect persistent across 
different market cycles?  
 
1.3.Research Plan  
In order to achieve these above objectives, the following research plan is adopted:  
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First, a survey of prior literature is carried out to identify various methodologies used to 
measure the market bargaining power of developers. Kilpatrick (1967) and Kwoka (1981) 
provided theoretical and empirical evidence that the choice of appropriate concentration 
indicator in fact matters for obtaining the correct conclusion. One goal of this study is to adopt 
the most appropriate measurement given the availability of data for the empirical tests. 
Alternative indicators of the seller’s market power will also be considered to check the 
robustness of the results. For example, the effects of market power at both the local and national 
levels are differentiated. It is anticipated that developers with significant market power at the 
national level will be able to set higher prices compared to the developers with significant 
market power at the district level only. Likewise, a buyer may choose to move to a more 
competitive district to obtain a lower price.  
Second, an empirical model will be developed to examine the effect of the seller’s market 
power on house prices in the primary market. A standard hedonic model will be employed to 
control for other determinants of house prices, such as floor area, floor level and distance to 
central business district (CBD). To control for potential endogeneity between selling price and 
time on the market, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model is adopted with both 
parameters set as dependent variables.  
Third, relevant data on sale prices, time on market, market concentration of developers and 
attributes of the units, projects and market conditions are collected. The main source of data is 
REALIS database, available from the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore. The 
database includes real estate transactions from 2002 Q3 to 2014 Q3. Obtaining development 
license is legally required from any entity that wishes to sell 4 or more units in an uncompleted 
residential project.  Therefore, REALIS database contains information on all private residential 
projects with more than 4 units, but it contains no information on developers with projects for 
less than 4 units.  
Fourth, the empirical models will be estimated and the results analysed and interpreted. 
Relevant robustness checks will also be conducted, which test the stability of the results subject 
to different market conditions. . In particular, we divide the sample periods into five sub-
periods:  one period of ‘declining’ market (2008 Q1 – 2009 Q2), two periods of ‘rising’ market 
(2004 Q3 – 2008 Q1, and 2009 Q2 – 2001 Q3) and two periods of ‘stable’ market (2002 Q3 – 
2004 Q3, and 2001 Q3 – 20014 Q3). House prices are expected to remain sticky even in a 
challenging market if the local supply of new homes are dominated by a single developer. Due 
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to lack of competition in the local district, he faces less pressure to reduce the reservation price. 
Developers with higher market power are usually larger developers who are less willing to 
trade off liquidity for higher revenue. 
Fifth, policy implications of the results on the housing market are discussed including 
suggested recommendations on improving the market efficiency in order to protect the buyer 
and increase social wellbeing. 
 
1.4.Structure of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this study is structured in the following: 
Chapter two provides the review of theoretical and empirical literature on the issues of real 
estate pricing and market power on pre-sale and re-sale markets.  
Chapter three introduces the methodology for the implementation of the study, including the 
key measures and the empirical model set-up.  
Chapter four describes the data that is used for the analysis, including the sources of data and 
sample selection. It also summarizes the recent situation with the real estate market 
concentration on the developers’ side in Singapore.  
Chapter five presents and discusses the results of the base model estimation. In addition, it 
implements the robustness check of the results from the previous chapter.  
The final chapter concludes with the summary of the key results and implications, policy 




Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on market power and asset prices. First, the relationship 
between market power and price leadership will be considered in the broad sense as well as in 
the context of real estate and land markets. Second, relevant empirical studies on the 
competitiveness of property developers and how they impact real estate prices are discussed. 
Finally, with the identification of the research gap, key implications for this study of the 
previous literature are provided, as well as the research gap this study aims to fill is discussed.  
 
2.1. Structure-Conduct-Performance Analysis 
The classic tool, structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP) is useful for the investigation 
of the effect of market concentration on prices... According to Shepherd (2004), SCP is a 
classical Industrial Economics tool for the analysis of markets and for development of 
economic policy. The SCP model suggests several market structures that include perfect 
competition, imperfect competition, oligopoly and, monopoly. Then market structure affects 
the conduct of the firms and determines the price-setting behaviour of the firms. Firms have 
incentives to invest into increasing barriers to entry in order to build their higher market power.  
Following Weiss (1979), when market concentration increases, it becomes easier for the firms 
to collude. As a result the firms will depart from the optimal relationship between price and 
marginal costs, and collude to set higher prices in order to earn greater profit margins.  Weiss 
(1979) presents a number of empirical studies that analysed the relationship between market 
structure and the price-marginal cost relationship and found that the divergence between price 
and marginal cost was increasing as the level of market concentration grows.  
Product differentiation, high initial required investment (barriers to entry), and falling marginal 
costs as production and sales increase are the most widely recognised sources where firms draw 
their market power (Shepherd, 2004). A number of empirical and theoretical studies discussed 
industry-specific sources of market power.  For example, William and Kessides (1993) 
investigated pricing in airline industry and confirmed the importance of such factors as airport 
dominance of airline, dominance at the rout level for the ability to set higher prices.  
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The SCP was used to draft antitrust legislation of many countries. However, it was later proven 
through the efficiency structure paradigm that increasing market concentration in itself does 
not necessarily lead to a corresponding divergence of the price and marginal cost. Efficiency 
structure paradigm was viewed as alternative to the SCP paradigm. Efficiency paradigm 
recognizes that in many cases increasing market concentration could achieve economies of 
scale and decrease marginal costs, which is beneficial for the firm as well as for the consumer.  
 
2.2. Types of Price Leadership  
Interests in market power and its effect on prices increased sharply with the application of 
economic analysis in U.S. court trials against monopolistic price-setting in several industries, 
such as tobacco and steel production (Markham, 1951). Several classifications of market power 
set-ups and types of price leadership have since been developed.  
One of the first few to systematically classify price leadership types is Scherer (1970), who 
suggested three types of price leadership – dominant, collusive, and barometric. A dominant 
type of price leadership describes a market with an established leader who sets the pricing 
policy with the other firms following it. A collusive type of price leadership involves a number 
of principal firms setting prices and the rest following their lead. The barometric type of price 
leadership describes a market in which there are many firms and the price leader acts as a 
‘barometer’ for the whole market. In other words, firms follow the pricing policy of the price 
leader which could be the only firm that invests in costly information acquisition to help make 
pricing decisions (Cooper, 1996).  
Distinguishing price leadership in markets with homogenous and heterogeneous goods 
(services), Ono (1982) suggests the following classification of price leadership: voluntary, 
deceived, and forced. In voluntary price leadership, the market dominant firm voluntarily 
becomes a price leader in order to reap economic benefits. Deceived type of price leadership 
refers to the situations with kinked demand function. Kinked demand function reveals the case 
where firms do not follow price increases, but they follow price cuts. According to Ono (1982), 
price leader is believed to benefit from maintaining higher price, but in fact it would benefit 
from implementing a price cut. Forced price leadership, on the other hand, describes the choice 
made by a firm to be in the price leadership position in order to avoid or to stop a price throat-
cutting competition among market-players.  
7 
 
One implication from the prior theoretical studies is that market power creates opportunities 
for firms to manipulate prices. While the issues discussed in this section are relevant for most 
industries, the peculiarities of the real estate development sector are considered in the next 
section.  
 
2.3. The Source of Developers’ Market Power  
A number of studies have challenged the traditional notion that real estate markets are 
competitive (Ahluwalia, 1994). Observing the rapid growth of land prices in several locations 
in Canada, Markusen and Scheffman (1978) model the market power of developers in urban 
areas to study their ability to raise prices. Given that urban territory is limited, the model shows 
that significant market power rests with a few large developers who control the supply of land 
plots to enhance their ability to set higher prices. Their model also shows that the developers’ 
action of withholding land plots closer to CBD may result in “leapfrog development”. “leapfrog 
development” describes the phenomena whereby that urban development process skips land 
plots closer to CBD in favour of those further from CBD, according to Ohls and Pines (1975). 
Mills’ (1980) model of market power also focuses on the concentration of urban land 
ownership by a few developers.  His model predicts that the pace of urban development is 
slower than it would have been in a more competitive urban land market. Modelling the market 
structure of urban development in a competitive framework, Read (1997) shows that the 
presence of several equally sized competing developers could lead to excessive overbuilding.   
Mills (1990) argues that urban policies, such as zoning and the granting or withholding of 
various permits by the local regulators could further entrench the market power of certain 
landowners. Analysing the numerous barriers to entry to the UK development market, 
Coiacetto (2009) highlights that new players face significant entry barriers due to huge capital 
outlay, strict regulation, economies of scale and cost advantage enjoyed by bigger firms, and 
local market knowledge. He thus suggested that the market structure of the development 
industry is not competitive, but is closer to an oligopolistic set-up.  
Besides controlling land supply, another way in which developer could acquire market power 
is by adopting a product differentiation strategy. By supplying houses with unique features to 
the market, developers could charge higher prices due to the lack of competition from when 
there are very few other suppliers of similar products. An implicit assumption in the hedonic 
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pricing framework, which has been adopted in many prior studies on real estate pricing such 
as Ong and Koh (2000), is the assumption that real estate markets are heterogeneous – real 
estate assets have many unique features and that ‘no one property is alike’. In fact, the hedonic 
pricing framework, developed by Rosen (1974), assumes that a property can be considered as 
a bundle of a number of characteristics and that there are implicit markets for the different 
characteristics contained in the product. The role of hedonic features for the real estate prices 
is reviewed in the next section.  
In summary, prior studies have showed how real estate developers could obtain market power 
by controlling and withholding the land development in urban areas, especially in areas close 
to CBD, in some cases by urban development policies of local authorities, and also by offering 
distinguished ‘unique’ characteristics of their real estate properties.  A number of researchers 
have also analysed peculiar feature of real estate development industry, such as Markusen and 
Scheffman (1978a), Read (1997), and Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin (1991) in the context  
of market power and price-setting in real estate development industry.  
 
2.4. Analysis of Empirical Studies   
2.4.1 Determinants of real estate prices  
Numerous studies have applied hedonic regression models, based on the framework developed 
by Rosen (1974), to study the determinants of real estate prices. The several studies that are 
considered here used the hedonic framework and extended it in a number of ways to account 
for the market structure and market condition. Among these extensions of hedonic framework 
is the analysis of a two-way relationship between selling price and time on the market using 
two-stage least squares (TSLS) and instrumental variables estimation techniques.  
 The study by Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin (1991) analyses house prices and TOM in 
conjunction with the real estate brokerage market using date in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 
Employing 3SLS with housing prices, days’ on-market and brokers’ commission as the three 
dependent variables in the estimation model, authors modelled the housing market and the real 
estate brokerage market as a single structure. In this way the hedonic pricing approach, set by 
Rosen (1974) was extended by a market structure component. The results confirmed a positive 
relationship between broker commission and days on market, but the paper did not examined 
the relationship between market concentration and prices. In fact, the authors concluded that 
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multiple listing service (MLS) prevented brokers from leveraging their position on the listing 
market to benefit in the house selling market. In their study, the number of sales agents of the 
brokerage firm is used as an instrument variable for the number of days on the market in the 
equation to explain selling price. They argued that the number of agents is a good proxy for the 
selling effort of brokers.  
Ong and Hoh (2000) in their study of real estate prices and TOM considered a set of hedonic 
characteristics, and extended it with the market condition variable. The model contained 
apartment-specific and district-specific features, such as district-specific dummies, floor level, 
season of the year, the number of rooms, and age of the house. Important result obtained by 
Ong and Hoh (2000) showed that the positive relationship between TOP and real estate prices 
was stronger for apartments on higher floors.  
Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) identified the importance of so called shopping externality for 
determining the housing prices. Term “shopping externality” refers to situations of high spatial 
concentration of sellers. This on one hand creates tight competition on the market that pushes 
prices downwards, but on the other it provides so called shopping externality that pulls prices 
upwards. Shopping externality occurs due to high spatial concentration of projects and 
developers that increase chances that buyers meet appropriate sellers in a shorter time, say 
during the day of visit. Therefore, buyers might be willing to pay higher price for a chance to 
meet appropriate seller. For this reason are more visits of buyers to the areas with higher spatial 
concentration of sellers and projects. Thus, in the areas with concentrated supply of houses, 
there is low concentration of sellers and, therefore, fewer visits of buyers due to absence of 
shopping externalities in those locations. Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) also implemented 
empirical analysis of shopping externality and obtained confirmation of it.  
The ideas of shopping externality were further analysed in study by Matthews and Turnbull 
(2007). This work considered the differentiating effect of other type of shopping externality, 
namely that from proximity of house to shopping malls, for pedestrian-oriented and auto-
oriented neighbourhoods. Matthews and Turnbull (2007) identified the trade-off between 
convenient access to retail and the negative effects from related noise, light, trash, and traffic. 
The positive effect from retail access outweighed the negative effects for pedestrian oriented 
communities, but it did not for auto-oriented ones.  
Further elaborations of real estate prices are related to the analysis of the interrelations between 
the primary and secondary housing markets. Leszczyński and Olszewski (2013) investigated 
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pricing of houses in 17 largest cities in Poland. Their results showed that secondary housing 
market provides pricing benchmark for the primary market. Also, availability of mortgages has 
statistically significant impact on secondary market pricing, but not on the primary market. 
Although these issues could be important for pricing, they are not considered in this study as 
they do not directly relate to the research objective.  
2.4.2 Competitiveness of real estate developers 
A number of empirical studies were concerned with the issues of market competitiveness and 
market concentration in the real estate and several directly related sectors. Often evidence 
regarding the level of competitiveness is mixed.  
Ball (1996) investigated the UK housing market and concluded that insufficient competition 
that is enforced with inefficient market policies is the course for a number of the UK housing 
market problems. The list of problems includes insufficient innovation, low price elasticity of 
housing supply, availability of highly standardized overly expensive houses.  
On other hand, Gibb and Keoghan (1996) speak of the intense competition between the local 
homebuilders in the Scottish market. According to their results, such fierce competition 
prevents development of the industry and limits the beneficial backward linkages into the 
homebuilders supply industries.  
Cronin (1983) was among the first researchers to empirically test the competitiveness of the 
housing rental submarkets in Washington DC, the USA. Authors used housing survey to obtain 
the data, containing over 850 valid observations, and found significant inverse relationship 
between the number of firms and the rental prices. Cronin (1983) concluded that housing 
submarkets in Washington DC significantly differed by the level of their competitiveness.  
Leishman (2001) empirically tested whether building firms in the UK are able to differentiate 
their output and, therefore, affect market prices. The analysis was based on the database of 
1,155 new housing deals in the period from 1989 to 1992. Hedonic regression model method 
was used. From the obtained empirical results Leishman (2001) concluded that prices 
differentials between different houses were not completely explained by hedonic physical 
characteristics, and to a certain degree they were therefore affected by the building firms due 
to their ability to ‘differentiate’ their output not only in terms of physical hedonic 
characteristics, but also in terms of quality.   
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The results of previous empirical studies provide the important results that should be 
considered in the current investigation. It should be noted that hedonic variables, such as age, 
floor area, number of rooms, number of floor, as well as age and district, are the significant 
determinants of real estate prices.  Besides, seasonality factor should be considered and overall 
economic activity of the market, such as the number of transactions per quarter. Also, the effect 
of TOM should be considered and the wo-way relationship between the prices and TOM should 
be regarded. In addition, market power of developers makes a considerable effect on housing 
prices. Therefore it also has to be included into the regression model and that is of the primary 
interest of this study.  
2.4.3 Relationship between Pricing and Time-on-Market 
Search theory suggests that marketing of durable goods, such as real estate, takes time. 
Investigating why time on market varies considerably across different properties, Haurin (1988) 
find a seasonality effect and that atypical (highly differentiated) properties tend to take a longer 
time to sell because of a larger dispersion in their price offerings. Another take away from 
Haurin’s study is that hedonic regression model per se is not sufficient to model house prices. 
In particular, he suggested that the models should be extended to include certain properties of 
the sellers, such as size of the seller.  
The relationship between time on-market and selling price is anticipated to be positively related, 
that is, ceteris paribus, properties which took a longer time to sell are expected to achieve a 
higher price. Sirmans, Turnbull, and Dombrow (1995) compare the selling prices of properties 
that were sold quickly with the prices of properties that took a long time to sell. They 
surprisingly failed to find any significant price difference between them and concluded that 
sellers were reasonably protected because of the developed brokerage and information systems 
(MLS – Multiple Listing Service) on the market. The market information system (MLS) 
quickly processes information on new offerings and provides information about wide pool of 
offered houses. In this way it significantly increases knowledge of the market by buyers and 
minimizes the risk of inefficient pricing by sellers and brokers which would be otherwise 
possible due to information asymmetry. The authors, however, did not analyse the reasons why 
certain properties were sold much faster than others, even though they commanded the same 
level of prices.  
In recognition of the two-way causation between house price and TOM, the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression technique is recommended. Ong and Hoh (2000), for example, study 
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how the prices of public flats in Singapore impact TOM, and vice-versa. Consistent with the 
theoretical prediction, they find that overpriced flats indeed required a longer to be sold. Ong 
and Hoh (2000) defined overpriced flats as those listed price was higher than the one computed 
based on its hedonic features.   
 
2.5.Summary of Literature Review 
The literature review in this chapter highlighted how market imperfection across different 
industries enabled the market leaders to set prices. The unique features of the property 
development sector, such as highly differentiated product, limited land and strict regulations 
on development, can also lead to market power concentrated on a few developers.   
In our subsequent examination on the impact of market power on house prices, our review of 
the literature indicates that firstly, hedonic price model is useful to control for the heterogeneity 
of property characteristics, such as floor area, floor level, number of rooms and bathrooms, 
proximity to CBD, and others. In addition to time-varying attributes such as seasonality and 
general economic condition, it is important to control for TOM which has been found to be a 
significant determinant of house prices. Moreover, two-stage lease squares (2SLS) technique 
is often employed to account for the relationships between housing prices and TOM.  
Therefore the current study builds on a number of previous works, in particular, Ong and Hoh 
(2000), and Turnbull and Dombrow (2006). The current study makes a number of contributions 
to the available literature. Although significant number of studies is available on hedonic 
pricing, there is a lack of studies that focused on the competitive structure of the local level and 
its effect on pricing. Previously most studies were performed for large markets, such as the UK 
or US, and most concerned with secondary housing market and brokerage market. In contrast, 
this study focuses on the primary housing market and on geographically small housing market 
of Singapore. Also this study emphasises the use of several alternative indicators of market 





Chapter 3 – Research Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the methodology to test the effect developers’ market power on real estate 
prices. The chapter is structured as follows. First, the key research hypotheses are discussed. 
Second, empirical model as well as the empirical regression estimation method will be 
presented and discussed. Then the key measures of market power are discussed. Finally, all the 
control variables are introduced, explained and prior expectations regarding their effect on 
housing prices are described.  
 
3.1. Research Hypotheses 
As was stated in Chapter 1, the objective of this study is to investigate the effect of developers’ 
market power on real estate prices. In particular, this study investigates this effect for a small 
developed Asian economy, such as Singapore.   
The research hypotheses in this chapter are rooted in the literature review and in the preliminary 
analysis of Singapore housing data. Generally, developers aim to achieve higher selling prices 
at the shortest time. According to Weiss (1979), suppliers with higher market concentration are 
able to collude to ration the supply, and can thus set higher prices. As the number of supplied 
units is limited, consumers are expected to spend shorter time for search and selection, 
therefore time on market is lower when there are suppliers with high market power. Such 
statement would be supported by Haurin (1988), who empirically verified that developer’s size 
has decreasing effect on the time-on-market variable. In view that prior studies, such as Ong 
and Koh (2000) and Kang and Gardner (1989) have found market condition to have a 
significant impact on housing prices and time-on-the-market, we also consider the effect of 
different market conditions in this study. 
While one could expect developers that possess high market power at the national level would 
also have higher market power at the regional level, the data on the contrary shows that 
developers with high market power at the national level do not always have equivalent market 
power at the regional level. In particular, a low negative correlation (-0.104) is observed 
between developers’ market power at the national and the regional levels.   
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The following research hypotheses are based on the research questions that were stated in 
Chapter 1.  
H1: Developers with a high market power can command higher selling prices.  
H2:  Developers with higher market power can sell their units faster. 
H3:  The effect of developers’ market power on selling prices and time on the market is the 
same across different market conditions. 
H4:   Developers that possess high market power at the national level have stronger ability to 
set higher real estate prices than developers that possess high market power at the 
regional level.  
 
3.2. Empirical Model 
Hedonic models have been used in many prior studies, such as Matthews and Turnbull (2007) 
and Ong and Hoh (2000), study house prices. The current study extends the basis hedonic 
model to include variables related to the features of developers, market activity, and also the 
developers’ market power.   
 The model can be expressed as follows:  
iiiiii DHTOMMPiceLn   ''Pr 210     (Eq. 1) 
where, LnPricei is natural logarithm of the selling price for house i; MPi is the market power 
of developer j; TOMi is the time-on-market for house i . Hi is a vector of hedonic features of 
house i , including floor level, area, maximum number of floors in the project, distance to CBD 
and distance to closest subway station. Di is a set of dummy variables denoting year and quarter 
of the individual transactions as well as the local district the house is located within Singapore. 
β0, β1, β2, vector α, and vector δ are the parameters of the model to be estimated; and εi is the 
regression residual of the model.  
 
3.3. Regression Estimation Method 
Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin (1991) find a two-way relationship between real estate prices 
and time-on-market. To address the potential endogeneity of selling price and time-on-market, 
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the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation method is employed. The method has been used 
previously by Turnbull and Benjamin (1991) and Yang and Yavas (1995).   
Estimating equation (1) using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method would lead to biased 
coefficients because the regression error term is correlated with explanatory variable (TOM).   
Following Wooldridge (2002), the 2SLS procedure is employed. It covers the following steps: 
Step 1 involves regressing TOM on a wide array of factors (see Yang and Yavas, 1995) and 
then forecasting the fitted values of TOM. Step 2 involves regressing Ln_Price against the 
predicted values for TOM using the 2SLS method.  
iiiiii DHOMTMPiceLn  
ˆPr 210      (Eq. 2.1) 
iiiiiii uDHInstriceLnMPTOM   Pr210     (Eq. 2.2) 
Where, variables in the equation for Ln_Price are as before, except for TOM, which is now 
included as the predicted variables. In the equation for TOM the set of explanatory variables 
includes MP, which is an indicator of developer’s market power, Ln_Price, and also the set of 
hedonic variables and the set of dummy variables. 
According to Wooldridge (2002), the set of independent variables in the equation for TOM 
should differ from that for Ln_Price, as the equation for TOM should contain at least one 
unique variables, which is not included into the price equation. This variable is referred to as 
instrumental variable (IV).  
In this study the equation for TOM is different from the equation for Ln_Price in the way that 
it includes TOP-20 as instrumental variable, where TOP-20 is the variable indicating whether 
the developer is among the largest developers in the country by the supply of units. Among the 
top-20 developers are City Developments Ltd (“CDL”), Far East Organisation (“FEO”), 
Frasers Centrepoint Limited (“CTP”) and CapitaLand Ltd (“CAP”) (the full list is provided in 
table 8). Top-20 developers account for 2/3 of the supply of apartments to the market. This 
instrumental variable is indicative of the size of developer – for example, large developers are 
able to commit more effort in selling apartments. The use of size-related variables as 
instruments for TOM was well-observed in study by Turnbull and Benjamin (1991). In addition 
to theoretical relevance, TOP-20 is statistically also a good instrument – the F-statistics in the 
regression between TOM and TOP-20 is 713, rejecting the null of no relationship between the 




Considering for the above, in a more detailed form, equations (2.1) and (2.2) could be 
represented as follows.  
Ln PRICE = β0 + β1MP + β2FH + β3TOM + β4CBD + β5MRT +  
+β6FLR + β7FLR2 + β8AREA + β9AREA2 + β10SIZE + β11SIZE2+   (Eq. 3.1) 
+β12TV +β13PPI + αiDi+ αmDm+ Ɛ  
TOM = β0 + β1MP + β2FH + β4CBD + β5MRT + β6TV + β7SIZE +  (Eq. 3.2) 
+ β8SIZE2 + β9TV + β10PPI + β11Ln PRICE + δ1TOP20+ αiDi+ αmDm + Ɛ 
In the model above the following variables are used: MP is an indicator of developer’s market 
power; FH is the dummy variable that is defined as one for unit that is a freehold deal and zero 
otherwise; TOM is time-on-market; CBD and MRT is distance from the unit to CBD and the 
closest subway station; FLR and FLR2 are the level of the floor and the level of floor squared, 
respectively;  AREA and AREA2 are area of the unit and area of the unit squared, respectively; 
SIZE and SIZE2 are the number of units in the project and number of units squared, respectively; 
PPI is the market price index of real estate; TOP20 is the instrumental variable in TOM 
equation representing the dummy variable for units in projects developed by top 20 developers 
in Singapore ranked by their total number of projects developed over the sample period from 
2003 to 2014 ; Di and Dm are the time-specific and district-specific dummy variables, 
respectively; and Ɛ is the regression residual term.  
Detailed explanation and calculation method regarding these variables is provided in sections 
3.4 and 3.5 of the current chapter.  
 
3.4. Key Indicators 
The key indicators of primary importance for this study are the housing price, time-on-market 
and indicators of market power. Estimation and calculation of these indicators, as well as 
explanation and prior expectations are discussed in this section.  
3.4.1. Housing prices 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the actual transaction price of the unit. Price 
of each unit is measured in Singapore dollars. Logarithm is used to allow for more convenient 
interpretation of the model coefficients, and also to allow for non-linear relation (e.g. 
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logarithmic) between the selling price and independent variables. In this was the model 
becomes non-linear in variables, but it remains linear in coefficients (Gujarati, 2004).  
3.4.2. Time-on-market 
An important variable that is expected to have a significant effect on the unit price is time-on-
market (TOM) or marketing time. Other researchers, such as Haurin (1988), Ong and Hoh 
(2000), analysed and confirmed significant relation between the two variables.   
In this study TOM is measured as the number of days that a specific unit was available on the 
market before being sold. It is measured from the first day of listing for the whole project. As 
the project data in REALIS documents the details of projects selling in the market including 
total units and remaining units in the project, the first day of listing is assumed to be the date 
which the project appears. For instance, project “Ardmore II” first appeared on 17th October, 
2006, the listing date for second phase of the Ardmore project will be considered as the same 
as the date of listing for the first phase.  The project named “Ardmore 3”, the third phase of the 
Ardmore project, first appeared on 17th October, 2012 and similarly the listing date of the third 
phase of the project will also be considered as the date of listing for the first phase. While the 
limitation of measurement accuracy is acknowledged for this assumption, it will not 
significantly affect the measurement of TOM due to two reasons: first, the listing date of the 
projects are counter-checked with reports and online news to minimize errors; second, though 
the unit is launched in the second phase, the developer has been selling the project since the 
listing date of the first phase. Using the listing date of the first phase will take into account 
factors like the developers’ capability to hold the units and their eagerness to sell.  
3.4.3. Homebuilder’s market power 
A number of alternative market power indicators are used in this study. These alternative 
indicators could be grouped into four categories – first, market power in the district level 
(variables MPL_PA and MPL_DA), second, market concentration (variable HHI_PA), third, 
market power at the national level (variable MPN_PA), as well as fourth, market power based 
on concentric rings (variables PA_1km, PA_2km, and PA_3km, as well as DA_1km, DA_2km, 
and DA_3km). The summary of the definition and calculation of the variables is provided in 





Market power in the district level 
Market power in the district level is computed for developers and for each project in the quarter 
of sale of the unit. Variable MPL_PA is computed as the ratio of the unsold number of units 
with the project to the total unsold number of units in the district. Variable MPL_DA is 
computed as the ratio of the unsold number of units of all projects owned by the developer to 
the total unsold number of units in the district. 
One challenge that was encountered in the data collection process was identification of the 
developers for the individual projects because they are carried out under separate legal entities. 
In order to identify the developers of the individual projects, the following steps were employed: 
1) All the major developers, such as City Developments Limited and Far East Organization, 
were identified by reviewing their company website and annual reports, if they are listed; 2) 
As these developers are reputable, they would find it advantageous to feature their group brand 
names in their marketing collaterals; 3) For those small projects developed by small developers 
with only one project (which cannot trace their parent company at all) the name of the developer 
will be recorded as was stated in the database; and 4) Associated companies, such as Far East 
Organisation and Yeo Hiap Seng are considered to be different developers for this study 
because they tend to operate under their own brand names.  
Despite best effort to ensure a robust approach to accurately identify the developers of 
individual projects, the limitation of identifying some of the sampled projects to their 
developers that were on the market many years ago is practically impossible. It is further 
acknowledged that associated companies may be on some instances more suited to be 
considered as a single developer due to the overlapping management staff. 
Given the large sample of projects and the existence of small developers in the market, it is 
challenging to ensure all the developers recorded were the parent companies; yet given the 
rigorous research undertaken the errors were minimized to the largest extend possible. It is also 
worthy to highlight that if the parent companies were not featured in their marketing websites, 
these projects did not benefit from the ‘branding’ provided by the reputable companies and the 
developers’ market power were not effectively utilized in the sale of these projects. 
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Market concentration indicator 
Market concentration indicator, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) shows the level of the 
market concentration in the region in the quarter when the unit is sold. It is computed for every 







2,   (Eq. 4) 
Where, HHI is the concentration index, MP_PA1, …, MP_PAn – are the respective market 
concentration indicators for each of all n projects that are available in the district i at the quarter 
t. Therefore HHI does not depend on specific project, as it shows the degree of market 
concentration in district i at quarter t. For example in Q4 2013 HHI in Novena district was 
equal to 15.9, which implies rather low level of market concentration, compared to Ang Mo 
Kio district where in Q4 2013 index equaled to 100. This is maximum possible value, implying 
that only one developer supplied houses in this district in the given quarter.   
Market power at the national level 
Market power at the national level is computed, similarly to the equivalent indicators at the 
district level, for each project in the quarter of sale of the unit. Variable MPN_PA is computed 
as the ratio of the unsold number of units with the project to the total unsold number of units 
in Singapore. 
Market power based on concentric rings 
Market power based on concentric rings indicators are also computed in the manner that is 
similar to calculation of MPL_PA and MPL_DA. The distinction of the use of concentric rings 
method is that instead of districts concentric rings of certain radius are applied. For feasibility 
analysis purposes alternative radiuses of concentric rings are used – of 1, 2, and 3 kilometres.  
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Table 1. Alternative definitions of market power  
Variable Definition Unit / Calculation 
Expected 
Sign         
(Ln Price) 
Expected 
Sign   
(TOM) 
1. Market power in the district level  
MPL_PA Market power of project i in its 
district at the quarter of 
transaction 
 % the project i has over the total supply 
in the district it locates during the 
quarter of launch 
+ +/- 
MPL_DA Market power of homebuilder j 
in its district at the quarter of 
transaction 
 % the project i has over the total supply 
in the district it locates during the 
quarter of launch 
+ +/- 
     
2. Market concentration measure  
HHIi,j,t Herfindahl Index of project i in 
district j at quarter t  
HHIi,j = MP_PA12 + MP_PA22+ 
MP_PA32+ MP_PA42+ 
MP_PA52…….+MP_PAn2,  
where n≤50 and represents the top n 
developers ranked according to market share 
in district j at quarter t  
+ +/- 
3. Market power in the national level 
MPN_PA Market power of developer i in 
Singapore in a quarter 
 % the developer i ’s supply has over of 
the total supply in the country at quarter 
t 
+ +/- 
4. Market power based on concentric rings 
PA_1KM Market power of project i within 
1KM radius 
 % the project i has over of the total 
supply within 1KM it locates 
+ +/- 
PA _2KM Market power of project i within 
2KM radius 
 % the project i has over of the total 
supply within 3KM it locates 
+ +/- 
PA _3KM Market power of project i within 
3KM radius 
 % the project i has over of the total 
supply within 3KM it locates 
+ +/- 
DA_1KM Market power of homebuilder j 
within 1KM radius 
 % the project i has over of the total 
supply within 1KM it locates 
+ +/- 
DA _2KM Market power of homebuilder j 
within 2KM radius 
 % the project i has over of the total 
supply within 3KM it locates 
+ +/- 
DA _3KM Market power of homebuilder j 
within 3KM radius 
 % the project i has over of the total 







3.5. Definition of Market Conditions 
Three different market conditions are distinguished for the purpose of the current study. These 
are ‘rising’, ‘declining’ and ‘stable’ market conditions. Similar analysis was performed by 
other researchers, for example Ngai and Tenreyro (2009) worked with definitions of ‘hot’ and 
‘cold’ market conditions, and Haurin (1988) included dummy variables for ‘summer’, ‘fall’ 
and ‘sprig’ conditions of market activity.  
Definition of different market conditions in this study is based on the dynamics of non-landed 
residential property index, which is publicly available and is maintained by Urban 
Development Agency (URA). Periods of growth in the index were defined as ‘rising market’ 
(further referred to as ‘rising market’), periods of decrease in the index were deemed as 
‘declining market’, and the periods of relative stability were classified as  ‘stable market’ 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Non-landed Property Index (From 2003 to 2014)  
 
Model that consists of equation 3.1and 3.2 was estimated to incorporate the effect of different 
market conditions. This was implemented by adding dummy variables for rising and for 
declining market condition, and by interacting MP indicator with each of these dummies. The 



















Ln PRICE = β0 + β1MP + β2MP*DE + β3MP*RIS + β4FH + β5TOM +  
+ β6CBD + β7MRT + β8FLR + β9FLR2 + β10AREA +    (Eq. 5.1) 
+ β11AREA2 + β12SIZE + β13SIZE2+ β14PPI + αiDi+ αmDm+ Ɛ  
TOM = β0 + β1MP + β2MP*DE + β3MP*RIS + β4FH + β5CBD +  
+ β6MRT + β7TV + β8SIZE + β9SIZE2 + β10PPI +    (Eq. 5.2) 
+ β11Ln PRICE + αiDi+ αmDm + Ɛ 
In equations (5.1) and (5.2) all variables are the same as in (3.1) and (3.2) except the interaction 
variables MP*DE and MP*RIS. These variables are constructed to show the difference of the 
effect of market power on the price in ‘rising’ and ‘declining’ markets versus ‘stable’ market, 
which is the default condition in equations (5.1) and (5.2). For example, the effect of MP on 
the unit price under ‘rising’ market conditions is captured by (β1+ β3), and its effect under 
‘declining’ market is captured by (β1+ β2). 
 
3.6. Control Variables 
In addition to market power and TOM, the regression models also include other variables that 
may affect house prices, namely floor level, floor area, distance to central business district 
(CBD). Binary variables to control for seasonality, district and year fixed-effects are also 
incorporated into the regression models. All these variables are summarised in Table 2 and 
their discussion follows.  
Some hedonic control variables are straightforward. The distance from the unit to the nearest 
subway (MRT), the distance from the unit to central business district (CBD) are naturally 
expected to have negative effect on housing price.   
House price is expected to be increasing with Floor level but at a decreasing rate. In addition, 
area of the unit is expected to have positive effect on the unit price, but also at a decreasing 
rate. 
Size of the development project where unit is located is expected to have generally positive 
impact because buyers will presumably be attracted to larger-sized developments to reduce 
their search costs and to enjoy better facilities and amenities associated with large projects. To 




Takeup shows the share of all units in the project that were sold in the first three months since 
the project availability for sale. It is expected that cheaper units are sold-out faster. Therefore, 
the expected effect of take-up unit on price is negative.  
TV is the transaction volume in the distinct in the given quarter. This variable characterises the 
size of the local market, therefore, available choice for the consumer. Thus it is expected to 
have negative impact on the unit price.  
Freehold ownership (as opposed to leasehold ownership) is associated with fuller ownership 
rights and is not limited in time (as leasehold). Therefore freehold units are expected to be more 
expensive.  
PPI (property price index) is the market price index of (non-land) real estate in Singapore. 
Naturally, the higher is the level of prices, the higher per unit price is expected. 
The top-20 developers were obtained for each quarter, based on the total number of supplied 
units in that quarter. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the average share of top-20 developers 
was more than 67% (two thirds). Also, as total number of developers is slightly greater than 
200, top-20 includes about 10% of all developers. As of Q3 2014 the list of top-20 developers 






Table 2. Control variables in the hedonic models  
Variable Definition Unit / Calculation 
Expected 
Sign         
(Ln Price) 
Expected 
Sign   
(TOM) 
MRTi Distance from property i to the 
closest subway station 
 
Kilometer - - 
CBDi Distance from property i to 
Central Business District 
 
Kilometer - + 
FLi Floor level of the property Number + +/- 
FL2i Floor level squared Number squared - +/- 
AREAi Unit area Square Meter + +/- 
AREA2i Unit area squared Square Meter squared - +/- 
SIZEi Total number of units in the 
project 
Number + + 
SIZE2i Size squared Number squared - - 
TAKEUP Take-up rate of the project Fraction + - 
TV Total number of transacted units 
in the district in the quarter 
Number - - 
Freehold Equals 1 for freehold units, 0 
otherwise 
Binary number + +/- 
PPI Price index of non-landed 
residential properties 
Index + +/- 
TOP-20* Equals 1 when project developed 
by one of the largest 20 
developers, 0 otherwise 
Binary number  - 
Devt_size* Total unsold units of the 
developer in the quarter in the 
district 
Number  - 
* TOP-20 and Devt_size are used as instruments for TOM in its effect on Ln Price, so they are 




Chapter 4 – Data 
 
Analysis and description of the data is provided in this chapter. The approach to selection of 
the sample data is firstly described. Then analysis of the descriptive statistics is provided for 
the dependent variable, TOM and the set of market power indicators, as well as for the control 
variables. In addition, correlation analysis is implemented for the explanatory variables.  
 
4.1.  Sample Selection 
The data for this study is the 2014 version of the Real Estate Information System (REALIS) 
database, available from the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) in Singapore. The 
database includes the real estate transactions from 2003 to 2014. Extreme values that fall in the 
two ends of the sample observation which are not representative are eliminated from the dataset. 
One example is one transaction observation for the condominium project Seletaris on 1st 
February, 2015 for a 26 square meters unit with a total transaction price of SGD130,000 which 
was the lowest in the database. It was removed from the sample due to two reasons: first, the 
area of the unit was stated 26 square meters, which was much lower than the second lowest 
unit type with area 98 square meters which could probably due to recording errors; second, this 
low transaction value was far below the average and median transaction price in 2005 which 
were 1,038,787 and 730,000 respectively. The removal of the extreme values has insignificant 
impact of the final results mainly due to two reasons: 1) the number of such extreme values is 
small; 2) though the total transaction value of this observation is much smaller, its price per 
square meter / per square feet was in line with other transactions in the same project in the same 
year. As the final regression results control for various variables including area (which is very 
small i.e. 26 square meters for example), the impact of extreme values was greatly alleviated.   
Recording errors including mistakes incurred during data entering, e.g. an apartment having 31 
bedrooms, or floor area of 50,000sqm etc. are addressed by either clarifying with Urban 
Redevelopment Authority for correction or eliminating from the sample. The final sample for 




The REALIS database includes information on all pipeline and newly completed projects that 
are developed by a private licenced developer. As Singapore real estate regulator, the 
Controller of Housing, requires licencing from any entity that wishes to sell 4 or more units in 
an uncompleted residential project. Therefore, REALIS database contains information on all 
private residential projects with more than 4 units.  
REALIS provides detailed information regarding the projects and developers. It is worth 
nothing that though REALIS does provide the developer name for each project, some of the 
developer names could be the subsidiary companies set up by big developers. As most 
subsidiary companies are fully controlled by their parent companies which will also be largely 
influenced by their market power, the projects developed by subsidiary of one company should 
be considered the projects of their parent company. It is acknowledged that the process of 
tracing back to the parent company of each subsidiary companies could be tedious and difficult, 
depending on the company tier (i.e. company scale, reputation etc). For top developers such as 
City Developments Limited or those that are either listed or very well-known in the market, 
they normally published the names of their subsidiary and all projects (including those 
developed by their subsidiaries) on annual reports or websites. Information on their subsidiaries 
were obtained by checking the annual reports and websites of the top developers. Online 
searches were made to obtain information required to group the projects under the respective 
mid-tier and smaller developers.   
Total supply on the market could be easily determined for each quarter during the sample 
period, as there is information regarding unsold units in each project for every time period.  For 
every licenced developer there is information regarding the projects launched. Therefore, all 
the market power indicators, which were discussed in Methodology chapter, could be 
computed from the sample data.  
 
4.2.  Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics shows the key parameters that characterise the data. These parameters are 
mean, which is the measure of central tendency, variance that is the measure of dispersion, and 
the minimum and maximum value of each variable. The descriptive statistics for each variables 
are presented in either table 3 (the dependent variable, TOM and market power indicators) or 
table 4 (the control variables).  
27 
 
4.2.1. Descriptive statistics for the key variables 
Analysis of the summary statistics for the dependent variables, time-on-market, and indicators 
of market power provide a number of insights. In fact, variables MPL_PA, MPL_DA, and 
HHI_PA have similar summary statistics (mean values, standard deviations). For example, 
average market power of project at district (local) level is 31.7%, and market power of 
developer at district level is 34.4%, which are rather high indicators.  
Comparison of mean values for market power indicators at local level to that of the market 
power indicator at national level shows that market power is more concentrated at the local 
level. For example, the mean (median) value for MPN_PA is 0.5% (0.2%) as compared to the 
mean (median) value of MPL_PA of 32.4% (18.4%).    
Concentric rings show that, relatively to the market power at district level, there is higher 
market power for rings with 1 and 2 km radius, but lower for rings with 3 km radius.  This 
suggests that average district size has more than 2.0 but less than 3.0 kilometres in radius.  
 
4.2.2. Descriptive statistics for control variables 
Descriptive statistics of control variables shows some mean values for the hedonic features, as 
well as it suggests that there is significant variability in these variables (relatively high standard 
deviation).  59.3% of units sold are on freehold land. The average unit in the sample is on the 
10th floor and has a floor area of 107 m2. It is located 7.71 km from CBD and 0.97 km from 
the nearest subway. In years 2003 – 2014 the average size of a project is 424 units (among the 
projects with at least four units). Projects have average take-up rate of 0.5812. The number of 
transacted units per quarter averages at 252 per quarter. And top 20 developers jointly account, 
on average, for more than two thirds (68.29%) of all units sold.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of Ln PRICE, TOM and market power indicators 
This table provides descriptive statistics for logarithm of unit price, time-on-market, and indicators of market power. The study period goes from 2003 – 
2014.   
Definition Variable Mean St Dev Min Max 
Log of unit price Ln PRICE 13.8932 0.5714 12.4645 19.6533 
Mkt power of project at local level MPL_PA 32.4836 32.9668 0.0207 100 
Mkt power of developer at local level MPL_DA 35.2174 33.5662 0.0207 100 
Market concentration HHI_PA 39.9570 29.9003 0.0029 100 
Market power of project at national level MPN_PA 0.4987 0.8884 0.0018 6.9426 
Market power of project within 1km ring MPL_1km 52.2993 32.5383 0.23 100 
Market power of project within 2km ring MPL _2km 33.1725 29.4434 0.10 100 
Market power of project within 3km ring MPL _3km 23.4504 24.8686 0.06 100 
Market power of developer within 1km ring MPD _1km 54.9354 32.3198 0.23 100 
Market power of developer within 2km ring MPD _2km 35.7282 29.4050 0.12 100 
Market power of developer within 3km ring MPD _3km 26.1701 24.7118 0.08 100 




Table 4. Descriptive statistics of control variables 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the control variables. The study period goes from 2003 – 2014.   
Definition Variable Mean St Dev Min Max 
Freehold feature of the unit FH 0.5925 0.4913 0 1 
Distance to CBD CBD 7.7076 4.6094 0.5481 19.7084 
Distance to the nearest subway station MRT 0.9725 0.6531 0.0345 3.8673 
The floor level of the unit FLOOR 9.6591 8.2531 1 69 
The floor level of the unit squared FLOOR2 161.4129 310.6708 1 4761 
Area of the unit AREA 106.9437 117.9161 24 28159 
Area of the unit squared AREA2 25341.03 2454315 576 7.93e+08 
Size of the unit project SIZE 424.1913 359.6433 6 1822 
Size of the unit project squared SIZE2 309280.4 543692.4 36 3319684 
Take-up rate of the project TAKEUP 0.5812 0.3032 0.0013 1 
The number of transacted units in quarter TV 251.9015 268.2023 1 2458 
Price index of non-landed residential properties PPI 121.2481 23.5161 79.6 148.9 





4.3.  Correlation Analysis 
According to Gujarati (2004), correlation analysis shows the strength of linear association 
between pairs of variables. Coefficient of correlation between a pair of variables ranges from -1 
to +1. Two variables are said to have strong correlation whenever absolute value of correlation 
coefficient between them is close to one, and the variables are said to be uncorrelated whenever 
value of correlation coefficient between them is close to zero. Also, when correlation 
coefficient is positive the variables are positively correlated, and when the coefficient is 
negative the variables are negatively correlated. 
According to Brooks (2008), correlation analysis is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it shows the 
strength of linear association between the dependent variable and each of the independent 
variables. This provides some hint on relationship between them. Secondly, it is important to 
analyse correlation between the independent variables. This analysis helps to verify whether 
multicollinearity among independent variables is likely. When independent variables are not 
independent from each other this causes multicollinearity problem. Under such problem model 
coefficients are not efficient – a model could have high goodness of fit parameter, but 
statistically insignificant variables (Brooks, 2008).  
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Table 5. Correlation analysis of the dependent variable, TOM and market power indicators 
This table provides correlation coefficients for the dependent variable, TOM, and market power indicators. The study period goes from 2003 – 2014.   
No. Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1)  Ln PRICE 1.00            
(2)  MPL_PA -0.246 1.00           
(3)  MPL_DA -0.225 0.965 1.00          
(4)  HHI_PA -0.252 0.823 0.828 1.00         
(5)  MPN_PA 0.122 -0.104 -0.108 -0.098 1.00        
(6)  MPL_1km 0.031 0.065 0.061 0.054 0.062 1.00       
(7)  MPL _2km 0.113 -0.015 -0.014 0.036 0.131 0.839 1.00      
(8)  MPL _3km 0.095 0.025 0.015 0.031 0.175 0.751 0.859 1.00     
(9)  MPD _1km 0.038 0.051 0.066 0.044 0.051 0.964 0.801 0.717 1.00    
(10)  MPD _2km 0.116 -0.002 0.014 0.050 0.128 0.824 0.966 0.839 0.831 1.00   
(11)  MPD _3km 0.087 0.066 0.069 0.066 0.145 0.740 0.840 0.942 0.755 0.887 1.00  







Table 6. Correlation analysis of the dependent variable and the control variables 
This table provides correlation coefficients for the dependent variable and the control variables. The study period goes from 2003 – 2014.   
No. Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1)  Ln PRICE 1.00              
(2)  FH 0.077 1.00             
(3)  CBD -0.281 -0.184 1.00            
(4)  MRT -0.064 -0.067 -0.022 1.00           
(5)  FLOOR 0.259 -0.163 -0.305 -0.014 1.00          
(6)  FLOOR2 0.221 -0.155 -0.277 -0.014 0.922 1.00         
(7)  AREA 0.522 -0.038 -0.037 -0.019 0.073 0.068 1.00        
(8)  AREA2 0.077 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.009 0.009 0.723 1.00       
(9)  SIZE -0.033 -0.448 0.252 -0.049 0.232 0.189 0.025 0.001 1.00      
(10)  SIZE2 0.021 -0.315 0.152 -0.059 0.185 0.162 0.029 0.004 0.923 1.00     
(11)  TAKEUP -0.079 0.111 0.002 0.014 0.003 0.015 -0.131 -0.009 -0.124 -0.146 1.00    
(12)  TV -0.076 -0.020 0.083 -0.022 -0.004 -0.017 -0.037 -0.005 0.220 0.259 0.085 1.00   
(13)  PPI 0.175 0.081 0.182 -0.020 -0.055 -0.061 -0.160 -0.004 0.121 0.122 0.242 0.096 1.00  
(14) TOP20 0.042 -0.265 0.127 0.061 0.026 0.025 0.087 0.001 0.333 0.257 -0.112 0.087 -0.103 1.00 
(15) TOM 0.169 -0.058 0.007 -0.015 0.046 0.043 0.111 0.002 0.152 0.176 -0.516 0.000 0.018 0.095 
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Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show correlation coefficients for the variables that are analysed in this study. 
There is no high pairwise correlation between Ln PRICE and TOP, Ln PRICE and market power 
indicators. Moreover, correlation between Ln PRICE and MPL_PA, MPL_DA, and HHI_PA is 
negative, whereas it is expected to be positive. But this could be due to the fact that other important 
variables are not considered, which is implemented in the regression analysis.  
There is very high correlation between MPL_PA and MPL_DA (coefficient of correlation is 0.965). 
Therefore, these two variables could not be included into the regression simultaneously, as this 
would result in multicollinearity problem.  
It is also worthy to highlight that there is negative correlation estimates between local market 
power at development level (MP_PA) and market power at national level (MPN_PA). It 
contradicts with conventional belief that If you have strong (weak) national market power, you are 
likely to have strong (weak) local market power, especially if you control for time (cross-section, 
i.e. year by year). However, in this context the negative correlation is largely due to the fact that 
developers with high national market power are not usually present in some small regions.  
Singapore’s 40 districts differ by number of units launched in 2003 – 2014 from 140 (Mandai) to 
14,197 (Bedok).  Some examples of projects with very high regional and low national market 
power (in 2014Q3): (1) “THE SANTORINI” (MPL_PA=82.09, MPN_PA=0.055, Size=597, 
district=’East Region’), (2) “LAKEVILLE” (MPL_PA=74.45, MPN_PA=0.0298, Size=696, 
district=’West Region’). 
 
4.4.   Summary 
Data sample was obtained from reputable source and is highly representative of the market, as it 
includes all private projects supplied in the time interval from 2003 to 2014.  
Descriptive statistics showed that there is significant market power at the local level, compared to 
the national level. As mean project market power at local level is 31.7% compared to the mean 
market power at national level of 0.5%. Also, descriptive statistics showed that significant 
variability in the variables, which is good for regression analysis.  
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Correlation analysis did not show tight linear association between price and market power, but 
such analysis does not consider for the effect of other important variables. But correlation 
analysis showed that MPL_PA and MPL_DA are highly correlated and should not be 






Chapter 5 - Empirical Results 
 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical tests on the impact of local market power on 
selling price and marketing time. The results of the base models, which serve to verify the first 
research hypothesis, will be discussed briefly in the first section. This is followed by a more 
detailed discussion of the results for the 2SLS models which test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
simultaneously. In the third section, the results of local market power on selling prices and 
marketing time over different market conditions are discussed (Hypothesis 3). Before the chapter 
concludes with the main empirical findings, additional tests are carried out to check the robustness 
of the results.  
  
5.1. Effect of developer’s market power on house prices 
The main goal of this part is to test the hypothesis 1 - developers with higher market power have 
greater ability to command higher real estate prices, compared to developers with less market 
power. Moreover, the higher real estate prices for developers with higher market power are not 
explained by physical (‘hedonic’) characteristics. Therefore, table 7 presents the OLS regression 
results on the base model to examine the impact of local market power on selling prices. Two 
indicators of local market power in the quarter of the sale transactions, namely the project’s local 
power (MPL_PA) and the developer’s (MPL_DA), are employed in the base regression model. The 
high indicators are highly correlated (coefficient of correlation is 0.9471).   
Firstly, OLS method is used to estimate the Base model, which is used as a benchmark for further 
analysis. Based on OLS estimation results, both measures of market power have positive effect on 
real estate prices. Increase in either market power of project or market power of developer by a 
percentage point is associated in increase of price by 0.03%. This result provides evidence in 
support of the above stated hypothesis 1, although the effect is rather low.   
Increase in time on market by extra 10 days is associated with 0.01% increase in the unit price. If 
a project sells for 6 months (e.g. 180 days) the incremental effect on price is 0.18%.  
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Regarding the hedonic variables, such as area, floor, and proximity to CBD and metro station, they 
have positive effect on transaction prices, but their effect is decreasing at the margin, as 
coefficients of the squared variables (floor, area, and size) are negative. Freehold property is 
approximately 4.5 – 4.6% higher priced than non-freehold property. Proximity to CBD and to 
subway station (MRT) has significant effect. For example, units that are located 5 kilometers away 
from CBD are priced 4.4% lower than the ones located in CBD, and units that are located 3 
kilometers away from MRT are priced 2.5% lower than the ones located near MRT. Units that are 
developed by the TOP-20 developers are prices, on average, 6% higher.  
 
Table 7. OLS Regression Results of Base Model 
This table presents regression results of the Base Model based on OLS. The results are stated separately for 
the model with Project market power and the model with Project developer market power. The study period 
covers 77,023 transactions from 2003 to 2014. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, 
respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses. The definitions of the variables are found in Table 1 and Table 
2 while their summary statistics are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. 
Variable 





Intercept 11.81144*** 11.75260*** 
 (325.66) (403.25) 
MPL_PA 0.00037***  
 (7.91)  
MPL_DA  0.00042*** 
  (9.60) 
TOM 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
 (5.02) (4.63) 
FH 0.04134*** 0.03979*** 
 (13.94) (13.49) 
CBD -0.01002*** -0.01002*** 
 (-19.83) (-20.18) 
MRT -0.02745*** -0.02743*** 
 (-19.81) (-19.95) 
FLR 0.00968*** 0.00972*** 
 (33.52) (33.89) 
FLR2 -0.00007*** -0.00007*** 
 (-9.49) (-9.47) 
AREA 0.00626*** 0.00625*** 









AREA2 -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 
 (-262.02) (-263.42) 
SIZE 0.00019*** 0.00020*** 
 (19.32) (19.70) 
SIZE2 -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 
 (-24.76) (-25.40) 
TAKEUP -0.05071*** -0.05182*** 
 (-13.29) (-13.70) 
PPI 0.01398*** 0.01387*** 
 (70.50) (71.16) 
Observations 77,023 78,016 
R-squared 0.83511 0.83331 
 
Although OLS model provides some useful results, it has serious drawbacks, which is endogeneity 
problem: price of real estate depends on TOM, but the latter could also be dependent on the price. 
According to Greene (2012), endogeneity results in biased model coefficients. Therefore, in order 
to avoid estimation bias, it is necessary to control for endogeneity in TOM, which is done by using 
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology.  
The Extended Model, based on 2SLS methodology, is used to empirically test two hypotheses. As 
previously mentioned, Hypothesis 1 suggests that developers with higher market power have 
greater ability to command higher real estate prices. Hypothesis 2 states that developers with 
higher market power are able to sell their sullied units faster.  
Table 9 reports the 2SLS Price equation and TOM equation, which include the key variables of 
interest – concentration indicators, and also the key control variables - relevant hedonic parameters, 
such as floor, area, size, proximity to the city business district. In addition to the market power 
indicators, time on the market, and hedonic variables, regressions controls for a number of fixed 
effects – location (dummies for each of the 37 planning areas in Singapore), time (year-specific 
dummy variables), and being top-20 (whether or not developer enters the top-20 group – proxy for 
branding and reputation of developer.  
In the price equation, the results of the OLS and 2SLS models are fairly similar. This shows that 
the results of the base model are robust. Most of the control variables also carry the same predicted 
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signs. In the price equation (tables 9), none of the results on house attributes or location variable 
coefficients shown are surprising.  
Focusing on our key variables of interest, MPL_PA and MPL_DA are both positive and 
statistically significant in Table 9. This indicates that possessing a stronger market power in the 
district markets creates an opportunity for the dominant homebuilders to extract a higher price for 
the apartments. The same results are observed for market power at the homebuilder’s level and 
project’s level. This confirms that regardless of the project level or developer level, the localized 
market power gained by the developers will enhance their pricing ability. The significance of the 
market power influence on house price persists when we control for the branding and reputation 
of the individual homebuilders (TOP20 - a dummy variable is included for a developed being 
within the top-20 largest developers).  
Table 8. Top-20 developers in Q3 2014 in Singapore 
No. Developer Total units 
1 City Developments Limited 10687 
2 Far East Organization 9084 
3 Frasers Centrepoint 5179 
4 CapitaLand Limited 5041 
5 UOL Group Limited 4218 
6 KeppeLand 3862 
7 Guoco Land Limited 3134 
8 Sim Lian 2870 
9 MCL Land 2843 
10 Heeton Holdings 2468 
11 All Green Group 2073 
12 Koh Bros 1901 
13 Oxley Group 1686 
14 Aspial Group 1439 
15 Kheong Leong 1343 
16 Novelty Group 1263 
17 Wing Tai 860 
18 Bartley Development Pte Ltd 702 
19 Ho Bee 698 




Focusing on the TOM (Hypothesis 2), the results for the two equations with TOM being the 
dependent variable are almost the same. Coefficients for MPL_PA and MPL_DA are negative and 
significant, suggesting that higher localized market power allows developers to dominate the local 
market and sell the units more quickly. Shorter time-on-market for real estate assets is a desired 
goal for developers, along with the goal of higher prices, because shorter TOM improves working 
capital management and reduces financing costs, e.g. “dollar today is better than dollar tomorrow” 
(Brealey et al., 2011). The finding corresponds to the theory on monopolistic competition. When 
a project has fewer competitors in vicinity, the homebuilders possess greater power to improve 
prices and market the units in the shorter time than homebuilders without market power (e.g. 
Markham, 1951). This result is robust on both the project and homebuilder’s level. On the other 
hand large developers, unlike their smaller competitors, have higher ability to withstand the 
temptation to reduce selling price in order to reduce TOM. But this second effect is not confirmed 
with the data.  
Positive coefficient was obtained for FLR: unit prices increase by 1.02% with each additional floor. 
The result is similar to the findings by Ong and Yen (2000) who also identified that units located 
in higher floors command higher per unit price. The effect of floor is slightly decreasing, as FLR2 
is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of floor is decreasing with each 
additional floor.   
Specifically, house prices are positively related to freehold tenure, higher floor level, larger floor 
area, and close proximity to CBD, subway stations and market price index. Variables CBD and 
MRT show negative signs because they measure the distance from the site to CBD and MRT (e.g. 
inverse of proximity). Time-on-market is also significant and positively related to house price, 
suggesting that homebuilders generally trade-off a longer marketing period for a higher price. The 
coefficient for take-up rate is negative, suggesting that projects with high take-up rate in the first 
3 months generally are generally priced less. This is consistent with the notion that overpriced 
houses take a longer time to sell (Ong and Yen, 2000).  
Variable TV (a proxy for market activity), which represents the total number of transacted units in 
the district in the quarter, is negative and significant for TOM in the model with Project market 
power, and it is negative and insignificant for the TOM in the model with developer market power. 
The effect of TV is insignificant for TOM in the model with developer market power because one 
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developer could have several projects in different districts, and the level of market activity differs 
between the districts.  
The discrepancy observed amongst all these models relates to the coefficient signs and significance 
of variables TAKEUP and TOP20.  Based on 2SLS estimation results, TOP20 is not significant 
for the price equation, whereas based on OLS estimation results it is positive and significant. Such 
result for 2SLS could be hypothetically linked to the fact that indicators of market power (e.g. 
MPL_PA and MPL_PD) already capture some effect of reputation and branding.    
The positive coefficient for LN_P indicates that units which takes a longer time to sell tend to sold 
at a higher price. The variables MPL_PA and MPL_DA in the TOM equations form a more 
complete analysis of the impact of developers’ localized market power. The coefficient for 
MPL_PA is positively significant; suggesting higher localized market power in the quarter of 
transaction allows developers to hold the housing units for a longer time in the market.  
 
Table 9. 2SLS Regression Results of Extended Model 
This table presents regression results of the Extended Model based on 2SLS (dependent variable is indicated 
in the header for each equation). The results are stated separately for the model with Project market power 
and the model with Project developer market power. The study period covers 79,535 transactions from 
2003 to 2014. Symbols *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively; t-statistics 
are in parentheses. The definitions of the variables are found in Table 3 and Table 4. 
Variable 









Intercept  -579.425***  10.52901***  
  (-12.78)  (76.08)  
MPL_PA 0.00796*** -2.54465***    
 (8.23) (-51.27)    
MPL_DA    0.00404*** -1.71215*** 
    (10.96) (-35.77) 
TOM 0.00306***   0.00222***  
 (8.01)   (10.31)  
FH 0.12647*** -30.4955***  0.09891*** -28.22197*** 
 (8.59) (-9.48)  (10.35) (-8.77) 
LN_P  75.94896***   76.36843*** 













CBD -0.01132*** 1.23254**  -0.01040*** 1.61035*** 
 (-6.51) (2.25)  (-18.01) (2.98) 
MRT -0.05644*** 11.78752***  -0.03084*** 13.67301*** 
 (-9.34) (7.85)  (-18.79) (9.04) 
FLR 0.01106***   0.01136***  
 (11.01)   (14.94)  
FLR2 -0.00022***   -0.00019***  
 (-7.09)   (-8.67)  
AREA 0.00483***   0.00520***  
 (25.79)   (46.80)  
AREA2 -0.00000***   -0.00000***  
 (-21.42)   (-38.65)  
SIZE -0.00024*** 0.11298***  -0.00002 0.06058*** 
 (-3.74) (10.35)  (-0.56) (5.59) 
SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00003***  -0.00000*** 0.00004*** 
 (-8.18) (4.51)  (-10.80) (5.21) 
TAKEUP 1.63483*** -546.056***  1.18439*** -551.14590*** 
 (7.76) (-147.55)  (9.86) (-149.79) 
TV -0.00000 -0.01674***  -0.00004*** -0.00520 
 (-0.04) (-3.71)  (-3.94) (-1.16) 
PPI 0.01587*** -1.73145***  0.01516*** -1.70249*** 
 (21.26) (-7.82)  (28.20) (-7.78) 
TOP20  16.35587***   23.31678*** 
  (6.64)   (9.48) 
Observations 76,823 76,823  77,816 76,823 
F-stat 552.88*** 1689.91***   119.74*** 1657.11*** 
 
Positive coefficient of MPL_PA in TOM equations supports the statement that when a project has 
fewer competitors in vicinity, the developer is not compelled to sell the housing units, possibly 
through compromising its profit margin due to the confidence of selling them at the expected prices 
due to the lack of competition around.     
It is worthy to highlight that variable TOP20 in TOM equation has obtained positive coefficients 
of 16.36 in the project model and 23.32 in the developer model. As was mentioned, TOP20 is a 
dummy variable denoting that the unit is supplied by a developer that is among the top 20 
developers in Singapore ranked by the total number of supplied units in each quarter. It predicts 
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that, ceteris paribus, the largest developers have longer marketing time for their projects, because 
they are able to wait longer due to their significant size. This does not necessarily contradict to the 
negative coefficients of MPL_DA and MPL_PA in the TOM equations (table 9). In fact correlations 
between top20 and MPL_DA, as well as between top20 and MPL_PA are up to 0.26-0.30, meaning 
that developers from the top 20 cohort do not always have high market power in each district where 
they supply units.  
 
5.2. Effect of market power in different market conditions 
This section is aimed to test Hypothesis 2 - the ability of developers with high market power to 
command higher real estate prices is maintained in different market states – ‘stable’, ‘rising’ and 
‘falling’ market. Therefore in this section, we extend our analysis to examine the impact of local 
market power in varying market conditions.  Based on the definition, we define three market 
conditions, namely rising (or booming), declining (or bust) market and flat based on market cycles 
and property index published by the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) in Singapore. Booms 
are typically defined as times when prices rise and there is intense trading activity, whereas busts 
are times when prices and trading activity fall below trend. 
Rising market conditions refer the period from 2004Q4 to 2008Q1 (14 consecutive quarters) and 
2009Q3 to 2011Q3 (9 quarters) where there is a rising trend observed for the property index. 
During each of these two time periods Singapore economy showed considerable growth as real 
GDP per capita increased, on average, by 5% per annum. Declining market refers to the period 
from 2008Q2 to 2009Q2 (5 consecutive quarters) the decline occurred during the global financial 
crisis and was caused by the crisis and the resulting shrinkage of the stock market and mortgage 
financing during these years. And the other time periods during 2002Q3 to 2004Q3 (9 quarters) 
are considered flat market which no large fluctuations in price index observed (Figure 3.1 in 
Chapter 3).  
The interaction term is added to 2SLS model to examine the unique effect of market power under 
various market conditions – rising and declining market dummies are interacted with the indicators 
of the market power, therefore coefficient of the market power indicators (not interacted) stand for 
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the flat market condition. Table 11 reports the 2SLS estimates for the regression expanded with 
the interaction terms.  
In the price equation, the impact of market power on asset pricing varies in different market 
conditions on both, homebuilder’s (MPL_DA) and project’s levels (MPL_PA). The interaction 
terms for declining and rising market are both negative and significant in the price equation with 
the indicator of project market power. Overall effect of market power indicator should be 
computed by adding the coefficient of the market power indicator with the coefficient of respective 
interaction term. For example, in the declining market magnitude of the effect of project market 
power is captured by coefficient 0.00901 (=0.01118 - 0.00217), and in the rising market its 
magnitude is estimated to equal 0.00907. Therefore, the effect of project market power on real 
estate prices remains positive and significant in the either market condition (interaction variables), 
although it decreases a bit in the rising and declining markets, compared to stable market (the 
default coefficient). The effect of interaction terms is insignificant in the price equation with the 
indicator of developer market power, meaning that no significant difference was identified in the 
effect of developer market power on real estate prices in rising or declining market, compared to 
stable market. In other words this indicates that developers with high market power are able to 
maintain their power to set higher prices in full in stable, rising or falling markets. 
Similar tendency as for the price equations is identified for the TOM equation: during the declining 
or rising market conditions the negative effect of the market power on the time on market slightly 
shrinks. Nevertheless, total effect of MPL_PA as well as of MPL_DA on transacted units’ time-
on-market stays consistently negative throughout all samples, indicating that the greater market 
power of the project or of the developer in the district during the quarter of transaction, the shorter 
time is required to sell the units in the project. Following the same approach as was described for 
the price equations, the effect of the market power indices on marketing time were determined for 
the declining and rising market condition (Table 10 below).  
In the declining market coefficients of MPL_PA and MPL_DA are, respectively, negative 2.3292 
and negative 1.6509, which is a decrease in absolute value by 22.0% and by 15.0% compared to 
the flat market.  In the rising market coefficients of MPL_PA and MPL_DA are, respectively, 
negative 2.34636 and negative 1.60137, which is a decrease in absolute value by 21.4% and by 
17.6% compared to the flat market. 
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Table 10. The effect of market power indices under different market conditions 
The effect for stable market is the default coefficient, the effects for declining market and rising market are 
obtained by adding the default coefficient and the interaction variable coefficient. The definitions of the 
variables are in Table 3.  
 Stable market Declining market Rising market 
Effect of MPL_PA on Price 0.0093 0.0075 0.0075 
Effect of MPL_DA on Price 0.0044 0.0040 0.0039 
Effect of MPL_PA on TOM -2.9847 -2.3292 -2.3464 
Effect of MPL_DA on TOM -1.9432 -1.6509 -1.6014 
 
This reinforces previous results that a larger market share for developer’s projects translates into 
greater market power and enhances its pricing power. Developers can counteract the negative 
impact of market conditions by utilizing their strong presence in the local district market. This 
enables them to command price premiums for houses sold, regardless the market conditions. 
Projects with greater market share in general take developers less time to market, as well as for 
developers with larger market power. Projects that maintain high market share are often already 
known to a number of potential buyers even before their marketing. These findings serve to prove 
that having greater market power allows developer to meet their two objectives in general. They 
are able to sell out their residential units for higher prices within a shorter marketing time 
regardless of different market conditions. 
 
Table 11. 2SLS Regression Results for Different market conditions 
This table presents regression results of the Base Model based on 2SLS (dependent variable is indicated in 
the header for each equation). The results are stated separately for the model with Project market power 
and the model with Project developer market power. The study period covers 79535 transactions from 2003 
to 2014.   
MPL_PA*DE and PML_PA*RIS are the interaction variables that are obtained by multiplying MPL_PA 
with the dummy variable for, respectively, declining and rising market condition. Similarly, MPL_DA*DE 
and MPL_DA*RIS are the interaction variables.  
Coefficients of ‘hedonic’ variables are not presented in the table as the results are close to the ones reported 
in the previous table. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively; t-statistics are 
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in parentheses. The definitions of the variables are in Table 1 and Table 2 while their summary statistics 
are presented in Table 3 and Table 4.   
Variable 









Intercept 11.52271***   8.34605*** -490.48073*** 
 (213.59)   (4.77) (-8.62) 
MPL_PA 0.00930*** -2.98472***    
 (7.85) (-43.07)    
MPL_PA*DE -0.00176*** 0.65548***    
 (-4.23) (6.34)    
MPL_PA*RIS -0.00172*** 0.63836***    
 (-5.03) (8.82)    
MPL_DA    0.00444*** -1.94319*** 
    (10.16) (-29.04) 
MPL_DA*DE    -0.00043* 0.29226*** 
    (-1.74) (2.90) 
MPL_DA*RIS    -0.00055*** 0.34182*** 
    (-3.00) (4.92) 
TOM 0.00311***   0.00224***  
 (7.86)   (10.21)  
LN_P  74.47859***   76.26372*** 
  (26.93)   (27.51) 
FLR 0.01047***   0.01119***  
 (10.30)   (14.65)  
FLR2 -0.00020***   -0.00018***  
 (-6.74)   (-8.50)  
AREA 0.00480***   0.00519***  
 (24.78)   (45.94)  
AREA2 -0.00000***   -0.00000***  
 (-20.57)   (-37.94)  
SIZE -0.00025*** 0.11543***  -0.00002 0.06322*** 
 (-3.76) (10.57)  (-0.69) (5.83) 
SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00004***  -0.00000*** 0.00004*** 
 (-8.17) (4.57)  (-10.73) (5.16) 
CBD -0.01084*** 1.02786*  -0.01081*** 1.26691** 
 (-6.13) (1.87)  (-8.30) (2.34) 
MRT -0.05652*** 11.62654***  -0.04330*** 9.21242*** 
 (-9.18) (7.74)  (-10.95) (6.14) 
TAKEUP 1.66514*** -545.33519***  1.19430*** -550.30943*** 
 (7.62) (-147.06)  (9.77) (-149.19) 













 (8.31) (-8.23)  (10.13) (-8.04) 
TV -0.00001 -0.01239***  -0.00004*** -0.00364 
 (-0.69) (-2.73)  (-4.12) (-0.81) 
PPI 0.01593*** -1.73795***  0.01530*** -1.76430*** 
 (19.68) (-7.36)  (26.20) (-7.53) 
TOP20  15.78600***   22.94325*** 
  (6.40)   (9.32) 
Observations 76,823 76,823  77,816 77,816 
F-stat 370.89*** 774.95***  86.28*** 747.03*** 
 
5.3. Robustness Tests 
This section conducts a number of additional tests to verify whether the effect of developers’ 
market power remains robust using different definitions of market power, namely The Herfindahl-
Hirshman index (HHI) to specify the competitive market structure at the local level. In addition, 
instead of computing market power by geographical boundaries, the market power is also 
computed using concentric rings of varying radius. Finally, the effect of local market power is 
contrasted with the effect of national market power. The last robustness test is particularly pertinent 
in a small island state of Singapore, whereby one may argue to the small size of Singapore, the 
control of supply in a particular district does not provide additional market power to a developer 
who controls a huge stock of the national supply. The two stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
method is used for the analysis; the results of these tests are presented in tables 8 – 12 and discussed 
below.  
 Estimation with HHI measure method 
Whereas in other sections concentration indicators referred to the market power of individual 
projects or developers, this section considers the indicator that describes the overall concentration 
in the district. Such indicator is Herfindahl-Hirschman index that was introduced in Chapter 3.  
Substitution of the market power index for HHI index provides somewhat different results for the 
Price and TOM equations. Unlike the result with the project market power index, the result with 
HHI suggests that the effect is positive but not statistically significant (table 12). This is because 
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concentration of individual developers or projects reveals their market power, but concentration 
of market does not necessarily imply market power for individual developer. For example, a 
market could be concentrated with two developers having 48% of the market each, and the third 
developer having just the remaining 4%. In this example the third developer does not have any 
significant market power.  
In the TOM equation, the effect of HHI on time on market is similar to that for MPL_PA and 
MPL_DA. With greater value of HHI, which represents greater monopolistic power in the market, 
the transacted units are able to achieve shorter time on market. Although for TOM equation when 
magnitude of the coefficient of HHI is compared to that of MPL_PA coefficient, it is found that 
the effect of HHI is considerably lower. This result is related to the nature of the indices. HHI 
represents the level of market concentration in the whole district irrespective of the particular 
developer or project, whereas MPL_PA represents market power of the given project in the district. 
Market prices of a particular project are more tightly related to the market power of that project 
rather than the level of market concentration of the whole district.  
 
Table 12. Regression Results for HHI measure method 
This table presents regression results of the Model based on HHI as the measure of the project’s market 
power in the district. Estimation is based on 2SLS (dependent variable is indicated in the header for each 
equation). The results are stated separately for the model with Project market power and the model with 
Project developer market power. The study period covers 81,982 transactions from 2003 to 2014.   
HHI_PA*DEC and HHI_PA*RIS are the interaction variables that are obtained by multiplying HHI_PA 
with the dummy variable for, respectively, declining and rising market condition. Similarly, 
MPL_PA*DEC and MPL_PA*RIS are the interaction variables.  
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses. The 
definitions of the variables are tabulated in Table 1 and Table 2, while their summary statistics are in Table 
3 and Table 4.  
Variable 
Market power - HHI: Project  










Intercept 10.94362*** -626.4273*** Intercept 11.52271***  
 (41.87) (-6.17)  (213.59)  
HHI_PA 0.00232*** -0.90101*** MPL_PA 0.00930*** -2.98472*** 




It could be concluded that the use of HHI instead of the market power of project in the quarter 
provides much weaker evidence that developers and projects with higher market power enjoy 
considerably higher prices and shorter time on market. Coefficient for HHI_PA in the price 
HHI_PA*DEC 0.00018 0.01752 MPL_PA*DEC -0.00176*** 0.65548*** 
 (0.64) (0.16)  (-4.23) (6.34) 
HHI_PA*RIS -0.00119*** 0.44266*** MPL_PA*RIS -0.00172*** 0.63836*** 
 (-5.41) (5.79)  (-5.03) (8.82) 
TOM 0.00238***  TOM 0.00311***  
 (8.40)   (7.86)  
LN_P  80.13493*** LN_P  74.47859*** 
  (30.15)   (26.93) 
FLR 0.01290***  FLR 0.01047***  
 (15.63)   (10.30)  
FLR2 -0.00023***  FLR2 -0.00020***  
 (-8.93)   (-6.74)  
AREA 0.00513***  AREA 0.00480***  
 (34.45)   (24.78)  
AREA2 -0.00000***  AREA2 -0.00000***  
 (-28.80)   (-20.57)  
SIZE 0.00022*** -0.03628*** SIZE -0.00025*** 0.11543*** 
 (8.51) (-3.52)  (-3.76) (10.57) 
SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00007*** SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00004*** 
 (-12.01) (9.64)  (-8.17) (4.57) 
CBD -0.00749*** -1.01887* CBD -0.01084*** 1.02786* 
 (-5.05) (-1.92)  (-6.13) (1.87) 
MRT -0.03955*** 9.09553*** MRT -0.05652*** 11.62654*** 
 (-9.12) (6.24)  (-9.18) (7.74) 
TAKEUP 1.22935*** -540.95285*** TAKEUP 1.66514*** -545.33519*** 
 (7.90) (-153.01)  (7.62) (-147.06) 
FH 0.10569*** -23.44101*** FH 0.11784*** -26.70473*** 
 (10.81) (-7.56)  (8.31) (-8.23) 
PPI 0.01740*** -2.32291*** PPI -0.00001 -0.01239*** 
 (26.01) (-10.02)  (-0.69) (-2.73) 
TV -0.00003*** -0.00207  0.01593*** -1.73795*** 
 (-3.16) (-0.48)  (19.68) (-7.36) 
TOP20  17.77948*** TOP20  15.78600*** 
  (7.65)   (6.40) 
Observations 81,982 81,982  76,823 76,823 
F-stat 60.17*** 786.22***  370.89*** 774.95*** 
49 
 
equation is statistically insignificant, and in the TOM equation the coefficient equals to -0.901 
which is more than three times lower in absolute value than the coefficient for MPL-PA.  
 
Estimation with concentric ring measure method 
In our final analysis, following Turnbull (2006) we recalibrate our measurement of local market 
power by defining local market boundary as concentric rings of various radiuses at project level. 
For the analysis three options of concentric rings radius are considered, namely 1 kilometer, 2 
kilometers and 3 kilometers, which, respectively, correspond to variables PLMP_1KM, 
PLMP_2KM and PLMP_3KM at project level, namely HLMP_1KM, HLMP_2KM and 
HLMP_3KM at homebuilder level. The use of concentric rings is an alternative approach to using 
the administrative districts as the basis for determining market concentration. One distinct 
advantage of using the concentric rings is that they have the same spatial area (by construction) 
unlike planning districts whose sizes vary. A counter-argument in favor of the planning districts 
might be that population density, as well as transport infrastructure development, are not uniform 
in Singapore, which reduces the usefulness of using the same spatial area measure (concentric 
rings).  
The directions of impact of the market power measured using concentric ring methods are not as 
consistent as that using the district. The results which are reported in Tables 13-15 show that 
coefficients of the concentric rings measures obtained on both, the project and developer, level are 
all either negative or statistically insignificant. A project with a greater market share in the quarter 
of transaction within 1 - 3KM centric ring leads to lower prices in following transactions.  
The conflicting results obtained upon substituting the localized market power measured to defining 
local market boundary as concentric rings could be explained by the shopping externality theory 
proposed in Turnbull et al. (2006). In contrary to the local market defined by district, the submarket 
defined according to concentric ring is much closer and smaller to the project. Having greater 
market power also means decreasing concentration of sellers in the area. This further decreases the 
shopping externality around the project, reducing the probability of successful match between 
sellers and buyers, therefore reducing the sale prices.  
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Undeniably, the increased market power enhances the developer’s pricing power; the negative (or 
insignificant) coefficients obtained reveal that when the local market is defined according to 
concentric rings, the shopping externality effect could dominate and greater market power within 
the submarkets will reduce house prices. Correlation between the project market indicators using 
concentric rings is rather high (table 5): correlation between concentration for 1 km and 2 km 
equals to 0.839, between 1 km  and 3 km equals 0.751, and between 2 km and 3 km it is 0859 . 
Following this logic, shopping externality has the highest effect for the smallest 1km centric rings, 
and it weakens as the radius increases. Such weakening of shopping externality with an increase 
in radius of concentric ring occurs as buyers’ ability to meet appropriate seller during the day of 
visit weakens because of increased transportation costs and time.  
Similar results as for the price equations were obtained for the TOM equations. Having larger 
market power in the quarter of transaction could lead to longer time-on-market for the project; the 
effect is negative and significant for 1KM concentric ring. For radiuses of 2KM and 3KM the 
coefficients are negative, but only for the project level. Also, when declining and rising market 
conditions are considered the coefficients of the concentration measures in TOM equation turn 
positive.  
Table 13. Regression Results for Concentric Ring Measure of 1 km 
This table presents regression results of the Model with market power measured by concentric ring measure 
method. The results are stated separately for the model with Project market power and the model with 
Project developer market power. The study period covers 82895 transactions.  
MPL_1*DEC and PML_1*RIS are the interaction variables that are obtained by multiplying MPL_1 with 
the dummy variable for, respectively, declining and rising market condition. Similarly, MPD_1*DEC and 
MPD_1*RIS are the interaction variables.  
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Definitions of the variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 while their summary statistics are provided 
in Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
Variable 









Intercept 10.65089*** -693.346*** Intercept 10.18971***  













MPL_1KM -0.00126*** 0.35357*** MPD_1KM -0.00114*** 0.28017*** 
 (-6.04) (7.20)  (-5.21) (5.77) 
MPL_1*DE -0.00164*** 0.60745*** MPD_1*DE -0.00187*** 0.63979*** 
 (-4.46) (6.48)  (-4.38) (6.88) 
MPL_1*RIS -0.00139*** 0.53564*** MPD_1*RIS -0.00170*** 0.60341*** 
 (-5.10) (9.80)  (-4.97) (11.21) 
TOM 0.00294***  TOM 0.00324***  
 (7.35)   (6.71)  
LN_P  82.38811*** LN_P  82.49257*** 
  (31.53)   (31.57) 
FLR 0.01322***  FLR 0.01330***  
 (13.23)   (12.13)  
FLR2 -0.00027***  FLR2 -0.00028***  
 (-7.91)   (-7.31)  
AREA 0.00483***  AREA 0.00468***  
 (22.61)   (18.26)  
AREA2 -0.00000***  AREA2 -0.00000***  
 (-18.76)   (-15.11)  
SIZE 0.00047*** -0.11622*** SIZE 0.00062*** -0.11143*** 
 (10.08) (-10.83)  (2.92) (-10.37) 
SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00012*** SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00011*** 
 (-9.88) (14.86)  (-8.87) (14.48) 
CBD -0.00562*** -0.85102* CBD -0.00561*** -0.72462 
 (-3.24) (-1.66)  (-2.95) (-1.42) 
MRT -0.02110*** 2.13845 MRT -0.02325*** 2.70547* 
 (-4.69) (1.46)  (-4.71) (1.85) 
TAKEUP 1.56559*** -547.7623*** TAKEUP 1.72724*** -546.35138*** 
 (7.04) (-157.95)  (6.45) (-157.41) 
FH 0.11404*** -23.00614*** FH 0.11608*** -21.94599*** 
 (9.29) (-7.49)  (8.52) (-7.13) 
TV -0.00001 -0.00784*  -0.00001 -0.00672 
 (-1.00) (-1.84)  (-0.97) (-1.57) 
PPI 0.01638*** -2.03906*** PPI 0.01676*** -2.08012*** 
 (20.73) (-9.01)  (18.65) (-9.18) 
TOP20  14.03138*** TOP20  12.39269*** 
  (6.13)   (5.41) 
Observations 82,895 82,895  82,895 82,895 





Table 14. Regression Results for Concentric Ring Measure of 2 km 
This table presents regression results of the Model with market power measured by concentric ring measure 
method. The results are stated separately for the model with Project market power and the model with 
Project developer market power. The study period covers 81511 transactions from 2003 to 2014.  
MPL_2*DEC and PML_2*RIS are the interaction variables that are obtained by multiplying MPL_1 with 
the dummy variable for, respectively, declining and rising market condition. Similarly, MPD_2*DEC and 
MPD_2*RIS are the interaction variables.  
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Definitions of the variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 while their summary statistics are provided 
in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 
Variable 
Market power: Project 
Variable 









Intercept 10.69323*** -697.1675*** Intercept 7.64512** -663.14103*** 
 (64.17) (-15.62)  (2.35) (-11.91) 
MPL_2KM 0.00010 -0.12282** MPD_2KM 0.00002 -0.06239 
 (0.53) (-2.02)  (0.09) (-1.05) 
MPL_2*DE -0.00226*** 0.66548*** MPD_2*DE -0.00204*** 0.57455*** 
 (-5.90) (5.84)  (-5.26) (5.09) 
MPL_2*RIS -0.00187*** 0.75242*** MPD_2*RIS -0.00169*** 0.68314*** 
 (-5.63) (10.94)  (-4.92) (10.21) 
TOM 0.00272***  TOM 0.00288***  
 (7.71)   (7.21)  
LN_P  82.0532*** LN_P  81.56712*** 
  (30.99)   (30.80) 
FLR 0.01262***  FLR 0.01273***  
 (13.81)   (13.16)  
FLR2 -0.00024***  FLR2 -0.00025***  
 (-8.16)   (-7.76)  
AREA 0.00494***  AREA 0.00487***  
 (26.35)   (23.26)  
AREA2 -0.00000***  AREA2 -0.00000***  
 (-21.96)   (-19.37)  
SIZE 0.00028*** -0.05174*** SIZE 0.00028*** -0.05204*** 
 (8.99) (-4.78)  (8.25) (-4.81) 
SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00008*** SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00008*** 




Market power: Project 
Variable 









CBD -0.00313* -2.00630*** CBD -0.00277 -2.01380*** 
 (-1.71) (-3.86)  (-1.41) (-3.87) 
MRT -0.02637*** 4.34293*** MRT -0.02960*** 4.84061*** 
 (-5.93) (2.88)  (-6.28) (3.21) 
TAKEUP 1.40677*** -535.5813*** TAKEUP 1.49089*** -535.19364*** 
 (7.33) (-152.22)  (6.87) (-152.13) 
FH 0.07005*** -8.29221*** FH 0.07236*** -8.51707*** 
 (7.67) (-2.64)  (7.50) (-2.71) 
TV -0.00003** -0.00319 TV -0.00003** -0.00298 
 (-2.26) (-0.74)  (-2.17) (-0.69) 
PPI 0.01601*** -2.10281*** PPI 0.01624*** -2.14571*** 
 (22.02) (-9.57)  (20.36) (-9.73) 
TOP20  15.22401*** TOP20  14.10706*** 
  (6.56)   (6.07) 
Observations 81,511 81,511  81,511 81,511 
F-stat 101.47*** 1672.02***  90.72*** 771.50*** 
 
 
Table 15. Regression Results for Concentric Ring Measure of 3 km 
This table presents regression results of the Model with market power measured by concentric ring measure 
method. The results are stated separately for the model with Project market power and the model with 
Project developer market power. The study period covers 81511 transactions from 2003 to 2014.  
MPL_3*DEC and PML_3*RIS are the interaction variables that are obtained by multiplying MPL_1 with 
the dummy variable for, respectively, declining and rising market condition. Similarly, MPD_3*DEC and 
MPD_3*RIS are the interaction variables.  
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Definitions of the variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 while their summary statistics are provided 














Intercept 7.48229** -669.671*** Intercept 10.60335*** -668.99049*** 
 (2.11) (-12.08)  (57.54) (-12.06) 
MPL_3KM 0.00111*** -0.49856*** MPD_3KM 0.00045* -0.18539** 
 (3.91) (-6.50)  (1.87) (-2.48) 
MPL_3*DEC -0.00307*** 0.93708*** MPD_3*DEC -0.00275*** 0.75598*** 
 (-6.36) (7.00)  (-5.72) (5.71) 
MPL_3*RIS -0.00352*** 1.29173*** MPD_3*RIS -0.00297*** 1.01478*** 
 (-6.86) (15.13)  (-6.25) (12.23) 
TOM 0.00273***  TOM 0.00295***  
 (7.73)   (7.28)  
LN_P  82.85364*** LN_P  82.38828*** 
  (31.31)   (31.13) 
FLR 0.01231***  FLR 0.01247***  
 (13.58)   (12.74)  
FLR2 -0.00023***  FLR2 -0.00024***  
 (-8.02)   (-7.61)  
AREA 0.00492***  AREA 0.00482***  
 (25.91)   (22.42)  
AREA2 -0.00000***  AREA2 -0.00000***  
 (-21.59)   (-18.65)  
SIZE 0.00028*** -0.04533*** SIZE 0.00031*** -0.05975*** 
 (8.67) (-4.09)  (8.62) (-5.38) 
SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00008*** SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00009*** 
 (-10.92) (9.84)  (-9.86) (11.08) 
CBD -0.00281 -2.09200*** CBD -0.00252 -2.00082*** 
 (-1.52) (-4.02)  (-1.26) (-3.85) 
MRT -0.02654*** 4.90131*** MRT -0.02693*** 4.17863*** 
 (-5.72) (3.17)  (-5.54) (2.71) 
TAKEUP 1.40948*** -534.5815*** TAKEUP 1.52667*** -534.41754*** 
 (7.35) (-152.09)  (6.95) (-152.07) 
FH 0.05841*** -4.74132 FH 0.06442*** -6.57878** 
 (6.47) (-1.50)  (6.60) (-2.09) 
TV -0.00003** -0.00256  -0.00003** -0.00342 
 (-2.35) (-0.59)  (-1.96) (-0.79) 
PPI 0.01637*** -2.18245*** PPI 0.01658*** -2.17771*** 
 (22.45) (-10.07)  (20.66) (-10.01) 
TOP20  15.11008*** TOP20  13.95851*** 













Observations 81,511 81,511  81,511 81,511 
F-stat 84.47*** 773.27***  109.61*** 772.45*** 
 
 Other Robustness Tests 
This section undertakes several other robustness tests – the use of the nationwide concentration 
index, and the test of lead-lag effects.  
Firstly, a project market power on the country level was used instead of at the district level. The 
usefulness of the analysis of the country level market power is based on the statement that for such 
geographically tight market as Singapore, ‘true’ market power could be that on the level of the 
whole country. And those developers that dominate over the whole territory of 718.3 km2 are 
equipped to charge higher prices at the district levels.  The actual results confirm this view. The 
regression results for country level, along with the comparable results for regional level, are 
presented in table 16.  
In the price equation, the effect of market power under flat market conditions is the same for both 
levels. But the positive effect of market power on prices on country level becomes stronger when 
declining and rising market conditions are considered. This suggests that developer market power 
on country level has higher effect than that on the regional level. This is in line with the common 
sense, as the ability to affect country market is, of course, preferred over the ability to affect 
regional market. Similar advantage of the country level market power over the regional one is 
identified in the TOM equation – for flat and declining market conditions. But the stronger effect 




Table 16. Regression Results for Project’s market power in the Country 
This table presents regression results of the Model of the Impact of Project’s market power in the Country 
(MPN_PA) based on 2SLS (dependent variable is indicated in the header for each equation). The results 
are stated separately for the model with Project market power and the model with Project developer market 
power. The study period covers 15,481 transactions from 2003 to 2014.  
MPN_PA*DEC and MPN_PA*RIS are the interaction variables that are obtained by multiplying MPN_PA 
with the dummy variable for, respectively, declining and rising market condition. Similarly, 
MPL_PA*DEC and MPL_PA*RIS are the interaction variables.  
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Definitions of the variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 2, and their summary statistics are provided 
in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 
Variable 
Market power in the 
country: Project 
Variable 










Intercept 10.54380*** -498.8493*** Intercept 11.52271***  
 (134.61) (-6.34)  (213.59)  
MPN_PA 0.01976*** -8.13907** MPL_PA 0.00930*** -2.98472*** 
 (4.28) (-2.27)  (7.85) (-43.07) 
MPN_PA*DEC 0.12035*** -63.52043*** MPL_PA*DEC -0.00176*** 0.65548*** 
 (7.02) (-5.19)  (-4.23) (6.34) 
MPN_PA*RIS -0.03564*** 39.42514*** MPL_PA*RIS -0.00172*** 0.63836*** 
 (-4.89) (8.19)  (-5.03) (8.82) 
TOM 0.00103***  TOM 0.00311***  
 (9.68)   (7.86)  
LN_P  85.81119*** LN_P  74.47859*** 
  (16.61)   (26.93) 
FLR 0.01330***  FLR 0.01047***  
 (16.14)   (10.30)  
FLR2 -0.00020***  FLR2 -0.00020***  
 (-11.32)   (-6.74)  
AREA 0.00955***  AREA 0.00480***  
 (62.42)   (24.78)  
AREA2 -0.00001***  AREA2 -0.00000***  
 (-31.64)   (-20.57)  
SIZE -0.00037*** 0.43202*** SIZE -0.00025*** 0.11543*** 
 (-4.79) (12.40)  (-3.76) (10.57) 
SIZE2 0.00000*** -0.00063*** SIZE2 -0.00000*** 0.00004*** 




Market power in the 
country: Project 
Variable 










CBD -0.00071 -2.28481** CBD -0.01084*** 1.02786* 
 (-0.50) (-2.15)  (-6.13) (1.87) 
MRT 0.02381*** -30.36687*** MRT -0.05652*** 11.62654*** 
 (4.69) (-8.67)  (-9.18) (7.74) 
TAKEUP 0.54310*** -568.1554*** TAKEUP 1.66514*** -545.33519*** 
 (8.88) (-66.76)  (7.62) (-147.06) 
FH 0.09931*** -6.30317 FH 0.11784*** -26.70473*** 
 (9.11) (-0.74)  (8.31) (-8.23) 
TV -0.00012*** 0.08142***  -0.00001 -0.01239*** 
 (-7.62) (7.55)  (-0.69) (-2.73) 
PPI 0.01645*** -4.56692*** PPI 0.01593*** -1.73795*** 
 (21.72) (-8.68)  (19.68) (-7.36) 
TOP20  58.29877*** TOP20  15.78600*** 
  (11.45)   (6.40) 
Observations 15,481 15,481  76,823 76,823 
F-stat 1.43×106*** 387.70***  370.89*** 774.95*** 
 
Finally, the significance of lead-lag effects on the unit prices and TOM is investigated. These 
effects could be significant, for example when there is a change in market power from one quarter 
to another either due to good sales in the last quarter, or introduction of a new competing project 
in the area next/last quarters.  
Table 17 reports the results where concentration indictors are included along with their lead and 
lagged values. The key variables of interest are the concentration indicators and their lagged and 
lead values. The results show that concentration indicators and their lagged values have the same 
signs as in previous models. More specifically, higher market power is associated with the higher 
unit prices and with lower TOMs.  
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Two important observations are made in this respect. Firstly, coefficients of the lagged 
concentration indicator are higher than for the current value (base) indicator. For example, in the 
Price equation MPL_PA has coefficient of 0.0008, and its lagged value (variable MPL_PA_L) has 
a higher coefficient of 0.00171. This suggest that firms could base their pricing decisions on the 
data for the previous  quarter, as the current quarter data is unavailable until the end of the quarter. 
Another observation is that lead concentration indicator do not have positive effect on price and 
negative effect on TOM. Conversely, the effect of MPL_PA_F is somewhat negative for the Price 
and statistically insignificant for TOM. Probably, firms in anticipation of increased market power 
are willing to set slightly lower prices, as well as experience longer TOMs, in the current period.  
Table 17. Regression Results for Lead-lag effects 
This table presents regression results of the Model of the Impact of Project’s and Developer’s lead and 
lagged market power (MPL_PA, and MPL_DA) based on 2SLS (dependent variable is indicated in the 
header for each equation). The results are stated separately for the model with Project market power and 
the model with Project developer market power. The study period covers 15,481 transactions from 2003 to 
2014.  
Variables MPL_PA_L and MPL_PA_F are obtained by taking, respectively, lagged values and lead 
(forward) values of MPL_PA. Also, in the similar manner, were obtained variables MPL_DA_L and 
MPL_DA_F.  
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Definitions of the variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 while their summary statistics are provided 
in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 
Variable 
Market power: Project  Market power: Developer 
Log(Price) TOM  Log(Price) TOM 
Intercept 11.21415*** -1,022.9522*** Intercept 11.60574*** -288.05738*** 
 (219.61) (-12.32)  (136.41) (-2.64) 
MPL_PA 0.00065*** -0.85180*** MPL_DA 0.00048*** -0.76871*** 
 (5.03) (-5.64)  (4.25) (-5.52) 
MPL_PA_F -0.00040*** -0.10478 MPL_DA_F -0.00050*** 0.61418*** 
 (-4.12) (-0.85)  (-5.30) (5.48) 
MPL_PA_L 0.00120*** -2.84612*** MPL_DA_D 0.00111*** -2.57171*** 
 (6.64) (-27.39)  (7.98) (-25.18) 




Market power: Project  Market power: Developer 
Log(Price) TOM  Log(Price) TOM 
 (4.04)   (3.37)  
LN_P  102.99699*** LN_P  100.62070*** 
  (23.88)   (23.65) 
FLR 0.00820***  FLR 0.00828***  
 (21.47)   (22.23)  
FLR2 -0.00007***  FLR2 -0.00007***  
 (-7.12)   (-7.07)  
AREA 0.00702***  AREA 0.00710***  
 (146.72)   (172.08)  
AREA2 -0.00000***  AREA2 -0.00000***  
 (-95.29)   (-103.77)  
SIZE 0.00003 0.39804*** SIZE 0.00008*** 0.33563*** 
 (1.15) (20.90)  (3.42) (17.68) 
SIZE2 -0.00000*** -0.00015*** SIZE2 -0.00000*** -0.00013*** 
 (-6.38) (-10.56)  (-8.96) (-9.29) 
CBD -0.01459*** 1.18442 CBD -0.01528*** 1.51736* 
 (-19.59) (1.25)  (-21.59) (1.65) 
MRT -0.03149*** 3.43105 MRT -0.02986*** -0.16947 
 (-17.78) (1.53)  (-17.16) (-0.08) 
TAKEUP 0.15269*** -579.03327*** TAKEUP 0.10416*** -578.57422*** 
 (4.50) (-86.44)  (3.76) (-88.15) 
FH 0.05555*** -37.72162*** FH 0.05350*** -38.35066*** 
 (12.29) (-7.36)  (12.39) (-7.48) 
TV -0.00003** -0.14990*** TV -0.00004*** -0.11940*** 
 (-2.50) (-16.35)  (-4.83) (-13.27) 
PPI 0.01424*** -1.24051*** PPI 0.01377*** -0.70611** 
 (53.11) (-3.58)  (53.89) (-2.10) 
TOP20  52.16505*** TOP20  63.35116*** 
  (13.39)   (16.33) 
Observations 34,199 34,199  35,124 35,124 






5.4. Summary  
The results from the robustness tests in this chapter provide mixed results. The effect of HHI on 
real estate prices and on the time-on-market was found to be considerably weaker than that of the 
market concentration indicators. Also, the use of concentric rings, which are much smaller units 
than regions, suggested that the advantage of developers with higher market power could turn into 
disadvantage. This relates to lower shopping externality under higher market concentration, and 
as the result – lower selling prices and lengthier time-on-market.  
Besides, market power on the country level has more pronounced effect on real estate prices and 
time-on-market than market power on regional level. The results of testing the lead and lagged 
effects of market concentration suggest that developers might base their decisions more on the 




Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
The conclusion chapter summarizes the key findings that were obtained in the previous parts of 
the dissertation. The most important results regarding the effect of developers’ market power on 
real estate prices and on time-on-market are briefly discussed here. These results pertain to the 
research questions stated in the introduction and the research hypotheses in the methodology 
section. Policy implications as well as limitations of this research are discussed, and some possible 
directions for the future research in this area are suggested.  
 
6.1. Summary of findings 
The contribution of this study towards the existing stock of literature is twofold. First, it fills in the 
gap in the existing literature regarding lack of empirical studies of the effect of developers’ market 
power on the real estate prices. Second, this study is devoted to the analysis of real estate market 
of Singapore that is a small developed Asian economy, and not many studies previously analysed 
the effect of market power on real estate pricing in Singapore and small developed Asian 
economies.  
This thesis aims to analyze the level of market power among developers in Singapore, and 
investigate the importance of the market power on asset prices and time on the market (TOM). The 
two research objectives are met in the thesis. First, descriptive statistics showed that there is 
significant market power at the local level, compared to the national level. As mean project market 
power at local level is 31.7% compared to the mean market power at national level of 0.5%. Second, 
the key results obtained in the course of conducting this research confirmed that developers with 
higher market power, measured by the regional developer’s market power index and by the 
regional project market power index, are able to sell real estate units for higher prices and at shorter 
time intervals. Also, the results verify that the benefits of having significant market power at 
district level slightly decrease in the declining and rising market conditions, but they still remain 
significant. In addition, it shows the benefits of having significant market power at national level 
do not vanish even in the declining or rising market conditions.  
62 
 
A number of other variables were confirmed to be important for pricing of housing units. Positive 
and significant effect on the price was demonstrated by such variables as the take-up rate, 
proximity to CBD and subway station, the level of floor, the freehold feature of the unit, and the 
general level of real estate prices (the price index). Negative effect on housing unit price was 
determined for the size of the project. Positive two-way causation was proved to take place 
between the housing unit price and the time-on-market for that unit.   
A number of curious findings were obtained from robustness tests. For example it was empirically 
identified that the market power of individual project or developer, measured by market power 
index, has stronger effect on prices than general market concentration, as measured by HHI index. 
Also, the use of concentric rings as the basis for determining the market power index suggested 
that there could be significant shopping externality. There is an inverse relation between the size 
of concentric rings and the effect of shopping externality – the identified effect was significant for 
concentric rings of 1km radius, and the effect weakened at radius of 2km and 3km. This 
observation was explained by the suggesting that physical ability of buyers to meet many sellers 
decreases as the radius of the area where these sellers are located increases.  
 
6.2. Policy Implications  
The results that were obtained during the completion of this study could provide a number of 
policy-relevant implications. Probably the most important implication is that attention has to be 
paid to market competition as opposed to market concentration not only at national level, but also 
at local district level. As was indicated by mean values of market power of developers at district 
level is much higher than that at national level, the potential problem with market competition 
could be more relevant for the local (district) level. Moreover, average level of market power of 
developers at district level in Singapore is more than 30%, which suggests that there are 
competition problems at district level.  
Secondly, market power in the country level is also an important issue. Developers that have higher 
market power at national level have stronger ability to set higher prices than developers with 
market power at district level.   
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Thirdly, it was noticed that the ability of developers to charge higher prices or sell units in a shorter 
time than the market average, decreases in the rising or declining market conditions. Therefore, it 
could be suggested that policies that facilitate overall economic growth and growth in real estate 
sector in particular, would also contribute towards more fair pricing in real estate sector.  
 
6.3. Limitations of the study 
Often limitations of the study are related to either the data, or empirical methods. For the current 
study limitations of the data are few, and there are some limitations of the methodology that should 
be briefly considered.  
One limitation is that the method used in this study does not analyse the dynamic changes in the 
real estate market over time. The year-specific dummy variables in the model consider the effect 
of changed market conditions, but there is no explicit analysis of how these conditions changed. 
Also, the current study does not consider any effect of the policy, such as taxation, or urban 
planning, on the pricing and competition among developers.  
Also, due to some limitations in data and in methodology several broadly common hedonic 
features were not considered in this research. These are such features as the number of bathrooms, 
number of bedrooms, and age of the housing unit.  
 
6.4. Suggestions for future research 
A number of issues could be further analysed in a more detail in the future research.  For example, 
empirical analysis of shopping externality in the market for pre-sale market deserves for separate 
research, as it could be analysed in a more detailed and focused manner.  
Also such issues as leapfrog development which was found to have considerable impact on real 
estate markets of western economies could be empirically analysed in case of Singapore real estate 
market.  
Few other questions of interest that could be pursued in the future relate to the dynamics of 
market concentration by developers at the district level, and analysis of the factors that cause 
64 
 
higher competition among developers. Also future research could analyse the effect of the 
availability of more information about the real estate market on competition among developers 
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